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Summary
The present project analyses the development of Italian asylum and migration policies and 
how these have been influenced by the development of the European Union’s efforts to define  
and shape a convergent and homogeneous policy between the member states.
The analysis takes point of departure in the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, when  
the area of asylum and migration came under 1st pillar of the Treaty of the European Union and 
hence under common decision competencies, up until 2009.
The project examines how Italian policies in this area have been affected by the increasing 
cooperation  at  the  EU  level  by  applying  the  theory  of  Europeanisation  as  a  theoretical 
framework, by doing so the profoundness of the Europeanisation is evaluated. The project takes  
a top-down approach to Europeanisation since the analysis solely evaluates how adaptational 
pressure from the EU has influenced Italian asylum and migration policies. Furthermore, the 
project examines how domestic factors influence this process and how they may change policy 
outcome at domestic level.
On the empirical level the project touches upon Italy’s, a) domestic asylum processes and 
treatment of asylum seekers, b) the general provisions and legislation regarding regulations of  
non-EU citizens residing in Italy c) and Italy’s externalisation of migration control through its  
contested cooperation with Libya. 
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1. Introduction
On May 6th, 2009, Italian patrol boats interdicted a boat with 230 migrants bound for the 
Italian  island of  Lampedusa,  and  returned  them to  Libya  (HRW, 2009:23).  The  incident, 
which involved a heated quarrel between Italy and Malta over the responsibility for the mi-
grants, caught the attention of the UNCHR and several international human rights organisa-
tion, which expressed their deep concern with fate of the migrants.
This incident marks the beginning of an enhanced cooperation between Italy and Libya, that a 
week later announced the beginning of joint naval patrols in Libyan territorial waters. The 
boats intercepted at sea (international, Libyan or Italian sea) are often forcibly returned to 
Libya, where migrants are subject to inhuman, degrading conditions and abuse in Libyan de-
tention centres. Libya, a country that has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, does not 
have a functioning asylum system. In the first week following the beginning of such opera-
tions, other 500 boats full of migrants were returned to Libya (HRW, 2009:23-24). Further-
more these practices de-facto deprive potential refugees of their basic human right of seeking 
asylum, as Italian patrol boats tow migrant boats from international waters without determin-
ing whether some might be refugees, sick or injured, pregnant women, unaccompanied chil-
dren, or victims of trafficking or other forms of violence. The patrols force the boat migrants 
onto Libyan vessels or take the migrants directly back to Libya, where the authorities immedi-
ately detain them (HRW, 2009:23).
These recent events – which triggered  much media attention in  and outside Italy – also 
sparked our initial interests on the field of migration and asylum: how could a member state 
of the EU make use of such practices, which clearly seemed a violation of basic Human 
Rights? And furthermore: who is responsible for the enforcement of such practices? And who 
is to blame, Rome or Brussels?Doesn't a set of rules on how to deal with migration flows,  
asylum seekers and third countries exist, in order to ensure a common approach of EU mem-
ber states to such issues?
As we started our research it became clear that the EU has significant influence on the devel-
opment of the member states’ asylum and migration policies. Secondly, we realised that not 
only Italy, but also Spain, Greece and Malta where exposed to similar problems and used a 
vast array of practices, and controversial cases involved several of these Mediterranean coun-
tries.
Our initial research revealed that already in 1990 – with the first Dublin Convention and later 
the London Resolution – the early cooperation on asylum and migration issues was initiated, 
to then rapidly increase and finally be shifted to the first pillar of the EU Treaty in 1999, with 
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. With the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, this de-
velopment has been strengthened to include visions of a “common  immigration policy aimed  
at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-
country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced  
measures  to  combat,  illegal  immigration  and  trafficking  in  human  beings” (TFEU, 
2009:Chapter 2 Art.63a).
This process, where a domestic policy area is increasingly being defined and shaped by de-
cisions made at the EU level, is referred to as Europeanisation. The term Europeanisation is 
used to describe how decisions at the EU level – in the Council, Parliament, Commission or 
other EU institutions – influence the domestic policies of the member states. We found this 
concept of analysis useful for the venture of exploring the developments of Italy's migration 
policies.
For these reasons, this project analyses in depth how the process of Europeanisation influence 
the Italian migration and asylum policies.
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2. Area of research
The process of enlargement of the EU to 27 member states, with the inclusion of a number of 
eastern European countries, led to an expansion and change in the Union's external borders. 
The inclusion of new countries with different historical and political traditions and with dif-
ferent capacities in controlling migratory flows, increased the need of the existing member 
states to strengthen their cooperation regarding the control of external borders and non-EU 
immigration. 
Since  its  introduction  with  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  1993,  immigration  was  included  in 
“Justice and Home Affairs”, the third pillar of the EU. As the initial intergovernmental co-
operation was considered not sufficiently satisfactory (Summaries of EU legislation:A), with 
the Amsterdam Treaty (which entered into force in 1999) the member states agreed upon a 
significant change by moving the issues of immigration, asylum and border control to the first 
pillar - the “European Community” - as a shared competence between the member states and 
the EU (Vevstad, 2006:70). External immigration towards the EU, originally a substantially 
national issue, was transformed into a European Union issue. The interdependency between 
member states had increased, as had the need of controlling the common borders in order to 
combat international crime, illegal immigration and guaranteeing public security within the 
Union itself. The European Union need to cope with irregular immigration has led to the es-
tablishment of (or to attempts to establish) a common EU migration and asylum policy. Above 
all, however, EU migration and asylum policy moved in the direction of a common return and 
visa policy, the improvement of information exchange and the coordination of control bodies, 
the creation of a European border guard and common sanctions (focus migration, 2008:4).
According to its geographical location, each member state has to deal with different degrees 
of pressure on its borders. EU countries in the south and east (e.g. Spain and Poland), sharing 
their borders with less rich countries not belonging to the European Union, are responsible for 
protecting their (and the common) land and sea borders. On the other hand, EU countries in 
the heart of Europe are basically “open” due to the removal of internal border controls within 
the  Schengen  area (focus  migration,  2008:3).  Faced  with  these  new  situations  national 
policies and strategies to manage immigration flows had to change. However, these policies 
and strategies differ greatly from country to country depending on the specific kind of immig-
ration each country attracts and the way in which the political-constitutional values underpin-
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ning the social consensus conceive the very idea of migration.  Italy is one of the states re-
sponsible for protecting the EU external border. Until very recently a country of emigration, 
only in the last 20 years has Italy found itself attracting unprecedented and unexpected flow 
of migrants  (Bia, 2004:10; Kosic & Triandafyllidou, 2007:188). Lately, Italy and other Medi-
terranean countries have become a favoured destinations for many African migrants. In 2008 
alone, EU patrol boats intercepted more than 20.000 people coming from African shores and 
trying to cross the Mediterranean sea (BBC, 14.10.2008). The situation was a result of a range 
of initiatives the EU and its member states launched to stop what is often referred to as “tides” 
and “waves” of illegal migrants “flooding” the shores of Europe (Corte, 2002:9; Andrijasevic, 
2009:156; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008:172). Not long after, Italy unilaterally began interdict-
ing boats of migrants in high sea and summarily returning them to Libya (HRW, 2009:23-24).
Being a country whose policies may not be a pure reflection of EU migration and asylum 
policies, and being a country that has received much interests for some controversial methods 
of dealing with irregular migration, Italy constitutes a perfect case study for this project.
On the one side, we have people willing to put their life at risk, to face inhumane treatment,  
degrading conditions and even death in order to reach Italy; on the other side, we have a 
country that seems to deny to these migrants the recognition of some of their basic human 
rights. Being Italy part of of the EU, and having the EU developed in recent years a series of 
specific policies to deal with migration and asylum issues, we can't help asking how Italian 
migration policy has been affected by the increased European integration in the field of mi-
gration and asylum policy. Whether this type of conduct in relation to migrants is a reflection 
of the EU immigration policy or not. This leads us to the research question:
How do Italian migration and asylum policies reflect the EU process towards harmonisation  
and standardisation of member states' asylum and migration policies?
To guide and structure our analysis we set up two sub-questions, which will enable us to an-
swer our research question. 
- What is  the level of  misfit  between EU and Italy regarding asylum and migration  
policies?
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By answering the first sub-question we will establish what the misfit between EU migration 
and asylum policies are. The level of misfit will be characterised in categories that are defined 
theoretically and empirically. This will be further explained in the methodology chapter.
- What processes and mechanisms can explain this level of misfit?
When answering the second sub-question we take as point of departure the findings from the 
first sub-question, and analyse the processes and mechanisms that impede or mediate the ad-
option of EU policies at the national level.
11
3. Methodology
The following chapter outlines how we intend to answer the research question. The task is to 
give an understanding of how asylum and migration policies are influenced by EU decisions 
and legislation. In this regard we introduce a methodological framework that enables us to 
measure the profoundness of Europeanisation in the case of asylum and migration policies.
In order to focus the analysis on what is the research question, the project will have limits as a 
matter of the policy area studied and of the time frame observed.
3.1 The policy area and its delimitations
As outlined in the problem field, this project intends to analyse the influence of EU migration 
and asylum policy on Italian policies of the same area. Therefore, this work starts with the as-
sumption that asylum and migration policies do exist at a European Union level. The exist-
ence of these policies, whether they are superficial indications to the member states or are 
instead part of the core values of the Union, will thus be considered only in regard to how and 
on what extent they are received and implemented in Italy. The processes that led to the form-
ation of such policies, their effectiveness and their level or rooting in the Union, although all 
very interesting research fields that would deserve a dedicated study, will therefore not be in-
vestigated here.
Assuming as a starting point the fact that the different positions and orientations at the EU 
level can be considered as a EU policy or set of policies, will allow to focus on the impact 
that these have on the problem field on which this project focuses.
The desire to analyse in-depth our specific case requires also other limitations.
The problem field will  in  fact  be exclusively limited to the policy area of migration and 
asylum, without investigation on other strictly interconnected fields. Although we recognise 
the importance and relevance of, for instance, EU and Italian integration policies, an analysis 
of these would influence the structure of the entire project and its effectiveness in answering 
the main research question. The time and resources of this project would in fact not allow an 
extensive in-depth analysis of more than one policy area.
A further delimitation of the policy area studied refers to the type of migration on which this 
analysis focuses. A delimitation will be drawn to divide EU internal migration from external 
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migration: the latter will be at the centre of our study. As internal migration we intend migrat-
ory flows internal to the borders of the Union, whether by EU citizens or by non-EU citizens 
that move within the area of the Union. In the term external migration, we include all migrat-
ory flows directed towards the European Union and originating from third countries. Despite 
the use of a general concept of external migration, we are well aware of the substantial differ -
ences that are present between different kinds of migrants: in this context external migration 
can in fact include in its definition economic workers as well as asylum seekers. Differences 
between the groups are important both legally (as the right to asylum is an internationally re-
cognised human right by the 1951 Geneva Convention), and for what is at stake, as often 
asylum seekers flee from situations in which their life is directly threatened, while economic 
workers do so only indirectly, fleeing from poverty. Despite these remarks, migration and 
asylum policies are highly interconnected and the asylum seekers are in the daily practice of-
ten subject to the same regulations that apply to other forms of migrants. For this reason, in 
this project, we will refer to the concept of migrants as an inclusive concept, in its broadest 
understanding.
“[...]migrant will describe the wide range of people travelling [...] irregularly [...]. It is inten-
ded as an inclusive rather than an exclusive term. In other words, to call someone a migrant  
in this report does not exclude the possibility that he or she may be an asylum seeker or  
refugee. ” (HRW, 2009:22).
3.2 Time-frame
The analysis of this project focuses on the time-frame 1997-2009. The 1997 starting point re-
flects the other choices in policy delimitation that have been taken and explained previously. 
It is in fact the year of the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (October 2nd, 1997), in which the 
EU migration and asylum policies were moved from the third to the first pillar of the Union 
(Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997:28). This moment is therefore identified as a starting point for 
common policies on the issues here studied, that until then were delegated to the member 
states and to their intergovernmental cooperation. Taking as a starting point the moment in 
which the migration and asylum policies are shifted to the first pillar, allows us to focus on 
the effect that the common policies have on the member state, leaving aside the process that 
led to the formation of these common policies, or the need that led to their creation.
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The Amsterdam Treaty was officially signed in the October 1997, but entered into force only 
18 months later. The decision of starting from the signing of the Treaty in 1997 rather than its 
entry into force, was taken in order to have the possibility of investigating if, how and how 
much the guidelines defined by it affected the Italian reform of migration policies that took 
place in 1998.
3.3 A single case study
The study will be carried out with a single case study – the Italian situation – rather than 
through a comparison of different EU member states. Other EU countries – particularly Medi-
terranean – could have offered similar pre-conditions and might have given a good possibility 
for a comparative study. Nonetheless the choice fell upon a single case study as a research 
method. Although often criticised (Flyvbjerg, 2004:420) as a social sciences research method, 
a single case study methodology would allow us to “[...] 'close in' on real-life situations and  
test  views  directly  in  relation  to  phenomena  as  they  unfold  in  practice.”  (Flyvbjerg, 
2004:428). As Flyvbjerg notes, it is more important to clarify the root causes behind a prob-
lem rather than whether or not the same problematic exists elsewhere or how often it occurs 
(Flyvbjerg, 2004:425). Italy, more in the specific, is not only a country on the external border 
of the EU that is exposed to external migratory flows, as other countries also are. Its migra-
tion-related policy and practices have very recently received much attention both nationally 
and internationally,  due  the  to  controversial  “Italy-Libya  case”  (HRW, 2009).  Italy could 
therefore constitute one of those “atypical or extreme cases [that] often reveal more informa-
tion because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied.”  
(Flyvbjerg, 2004:425).
3.4 Choice of sources
This study will hence be a qualitative study carried out through the research of documents. 
The choice of documentary research instead of the use of tools such as interviews was taken 
given both the quality and the contingencies of this project. Being our analyses focused on the 
level of adaptation of specific policies in a specific time-span, document analysis is a useful 
methodological approach as it is capable of outlining“[...] the historical formation, continuit-
ies and shifts in the norms [...]” (Esmark & Triantafillou, 2007:99).
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Documents are also more reliable sources compared to witnesses, since, as Esmark and Tri-
antafillou point out
"[…] interviews and questionnaires also offer the possibility of uncovering past events. But as 
is well known, these methods are bounded by personal knowledge, memory and the tendency 
of interviewees and respondents to rationalise past events according to their own idiosyncratic 
interpretation. In short, no other method [than document analysis] offers the same degree of 
access to the historical preconditions of current affairs." (Esmark & Triantafillou, 2007:103).
On a more contingent level, having the study been carried out in Denmark, it would have 
been difficult to find well-prepared interviewees that could contribute to the research.
Specifically, this project is making use of different kinds of documents. In order to highlight 
the policy changes both at the European level and at the Italian level, we will refer both to 
primary source documents (e.g. directives, treaties, laws) issued by EU and Italian institu-
tions, and to academic papers that can give a helpful insight and a better understanding of 
such  processes.  We  will  make  use  of  documents  that  focus  on  the  EU  level  or  on  the 
Europeanisation processes of migration policies, as well as studies that focus specifically on 
the Italian case, on its policies and their development.
The analysis of which factors influence policy making in our case study will be carried out on 
two different levels. The role of institutional actors will be investigated through an analysis of 
which  legislative  mechanisms  have  been  used  to  pursue  any  specific  policy,  as  well  as 
through academic papers that describe policy processes. The electoral programs issued by the 
two main coalitions in the time-frame analysed will be used to extrapolate which conception 
of  migration  the  different  governments  had (as  a  formal  mediating  factor),  and will  also 
provide useful insight into the norms and understandings about migration that lie in Italian so-
ciety (informal mediating factor). To complete the understanding of these societal norms and 
wide-spread conception of migratory issues by Italian society, we will also make use of re-
search papers that investigated how migrants and migrations are portrayed by Italian media. 
3.5 Final methodological notes
On a final methodological note, we consider important to note that generalisation from a case 
study can be regarded as difficult, but so it is in general in the field of social sciences (Flyvb-
jerg, 2004:422). With this project we investigate a specific policy area in a specific time-
frame and with specific actors involved; there is no intention of making a rule out of this par-
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ticular case, nor of predicting future developments in the field studied. At best, it will be given 
an understanding of the specific processes studied, with the possibility to better understand 
future processes in the same policy area. As Flyvbjerg writes:
“Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete,  
context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search for predictive  
theories and universals.” (Flyvbjerg, 2004:423).
Having set and explained these basic lines along which the project will be moving, it is left 
the question of how we are going to carry out the analysis needed to answer the research 
question.
The use of the theories of Europeanisation and the measuring tools given by some of its theor-
ists will be applied to the situation studied, as it will be better explained in the following 
chapters.
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4. Theoretical framework
In the following chapter the theoretical framework of the project is introduced. Firstly, we in-
troduce  the  concept  of  European  integration  and  the  theories  that  relate  to  the  study of 
European integration. Secondly, we conceptualise and clarify the concept of Europeanisation, 
which will be utilised in the analysis of how the Italian migration and asylum policy has been 
influenced by the European integration process.
4.1 European integration
The following section puts the concept of European integration into a broader theoretical per-
spective and address different theoretical approaches, such as supranationalism, intergovern-
mentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. The section outlines the different approaches, 
research agendas and definitions of the term European integration.
There is a wide variety of theories that interpret what is and has been the driving force of the 
European integration processes, since the European Coal and Steel Community and up to 
present day treaties, with common decision-making on a variety of issues. Historically, these 
theories of integration can be divided into three phases. (1) The classical integration theories, 
which were developed in the 1950ies, 60ies and beginning of the 70ies: these are known as 
functionalism,  federalism,  trans-nationalism,  intergovernmentalism  and  neo-functionalism. 
(2) The debate between proponents of neo-liberal intergovernmentalism and new forms of in-
stitutionalism. From the mid 1970ies to the end of 1980ies there was a recession in the clas-
sical theories of integration. (3) With the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the European Union gained momentum again and so did the 
theories of integration. The new theoretical debate now stands between liberal intergovern-
mentalism and multi-level governance (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008: 159-60).
In the following sections we briefly touch upon the theoretical concepts of intergovernmental-
ism, supranationalism and liberal intergovernmentalism in order to outline some central theor-
etical approaches to the European integration that we find useful in order to understand the 
development of EU institutions, the interaction between the member states and their reasons 
for engaging in cooperation within the EU frame.
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Intergovernmentalism is a theory of European integration, which emphasises the central role 
of states in the process of integration (Sweeney, 2005:137). Intergovernmentalism indicates a 
government-to-government process of decision making, where the states make agreements on 
issues of common interests. Even though it can involve a multinational negotiation or a com-
bination of several such negotiations, the approach to policy making suggests that the bargain-
ing and consensus building techniques which have emerged in the Communities are mere 
refinements of intergovernmental diplomacy (Wallace, Wallace & Pollack, 2005:17). The the-
ory of intergovernmentalism has been further developed to what is called Liberal Intergovern-
mentalism, which shares some of the same characteristics and elaborates on certain aspects. It 
argues that integration cannot be explained only by a single factor, but by a combination of 
multiple different theories and factors, which can be summed up as: “(1) a liberal theory of  
national preference formation with; (2) an intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining;  
and (3) a model of institutional choice emphasizing the role of international institutions in  
providing ‘credible commitments’ for member governments” (Wallace,  Wallace & Pollack, 
2005:18). Supranationalism is often described as the opposite of intergovernmentalism, be-
cause it is an approach to the decision-making in international politics that focuses on policy 
practice where states are bound by legal frameworks enforced through a higher authority that 
can enforce sanctions on the member states (Sweeney, 2005:138). Supranationalism moves 
decision-making to a higher level than the single national level, and produces biding decisions 
for the national governments. Hence, the sovereign states engage themselves in binding co-
operation, which constrains their sovereignty on a range of questions (Sweeney, 2005:139).
Despite the different interpretations of what causes European integration and whether it is en-
hanced  by  the  member  states'  own  agendas  or  by  supranational  actors,  it  is  clear  that 
European integration is a fact. As Radaelli puts it: “Europeanization would not exist without  
European integration”, as European integration is connected to the ontological stage of EU 
research and thus examines what the EU is and how it functions, whereas Europeanisation is 
post-ontological,  only  dealing  with  what  happens  once  the  EU  institutions  are  shaped 
(Radaelli, 2003:28). This is also the focus of this project, as we don’t analyse the development 
of a common EU asylum and migration policy,  but focus on how this common European 
framework has affected Italy’s policies in this area.
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4.2 Europeanisation
In this section we introduce and define the concept of Europeanisation, how Europeanisation 
is measured and how it can explain changes in member states' domestic policy.
As pointed out, the study of Europeanisation differs from the study of European integration, 
as the latter scrutinises the interplay and decision-making at the level of the different EU insti-
tutions, while the former analyses the effects and the outcome at a national level (Kelstrup, 
Martinsen & Wind, 2008:320).
A recurrent theme in political debates about the EU and studies of the EU has been the re-
search about what the European integration means for the national sovereignty of member 
states and for their national political competencies and room for manoeuvre. As EU decision-
making competencies have deepened and the areas/sectors of influence have broadened, how 
the EU influences politics and policies of its member states has started to constitute a discip-
line on its own. From the mid 1990ies onwards we can observe “Europeanisation” as an inde-
pendent research agenda (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:320). Consequently, studies of 
Europeanisation deal with the consequences of EU membership on the individual member 
states.
The concept of Europeanisation is widely contested among scholars and there is considerable 
discussion and diversity of opinions about how to apply, understand and interpret European-
isation, which reflect the vivid and ongoing research agenda. It is debated whether European-
isation is a strictly top-down process or if bottom-up approaches can be applicable as well. 
Moreover, the question of convergence or harmonisation as the main outcome of European-
isation is also highly debatable, if considering that different degrees of impact, and not only 
convergence, are often accounted for. The fact that Europeanisation can be seen at different 
stages, and as having different degrees of impact, helps to generate a broader picture of the 
concept.
How Europeanisation is to be interpreted depends on the scholar's definition, which, to a high 
degree, also determines the outcome of the research (Featherstone, 2003: 17). 
Furthermore, there is fervent debate about the fact that, within the wide political science area 
of study, Europeanisation is not properly characterised as a theory and research in the field is 
still  very  much  open  for  questioning  on  empirical  and  methodological  issues  (Radaelli, 
2003:27). By some, Europeanisation is considered to be more a concept than a theory. If the 
19
concept is in constant evolution and still remains open for interpretations and allows altera-
tions, it may not yet be ready to be considered a strict theoretical term. The absence of strict  
theoretical and empirical boundaries can stretch interpretations to the furthest and can leave 
doubt about the final analytical outcome of the research and of the generalisation of its con-
clusions (Radaelli, 2003:27-8).
With these potential shortcomings in mind, we will throughout the chapter conceptualise an 
analytical framework that takes this into account. Therefore we introduce – in the following 
sections –   clear definitions of the relationship between Europeanisation and institutionalism, 
a definition of the concept Europeanisation, the domestic outcomes of Europeanisation, the 
vertical and horizontal mechanisms and the domestic factors that mediate Europeanisation.
4.2.1 Europeanisation and institutionalism
In this section we briefly introduce the three different variants of 'new institutionalism' which 
are often referred to as central when analysing changes in the domestic policy sphere. The 
theoretical concept of Europeanisation cannot stand alone when explaining these changes that 
it induces (Vink, 2002:10). Throughout the analysis we will refer to these institutional under-
standings only to further interpret the reasons behind change and how the processes involving 
mediating factors can be explained. However, it should be noted that these will not constitute 
the main theoretical tool used in the analytical part.
Europeanisation is often associated with new institutionalism, namely rational choice institu-
tionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism (hereinafter RCI, SI and 
HI). Each of the three strands of new institutionalism has different epistemological and onto-
logical views, while interpreting the role of institutions in the EU in a different way (Vink, 
2002:3). RCI is a theoretical strand which assert that actors behave rationally and utility max-
imizing whereas in contrast, SI has a much broader view of institutions where focus is put on 
formal and informal norms and rules and how they affect actors (Vink, 2002:11). The final 
strand of new institutionalism is HI and it focuses on the effects of institutions over time. 
However, being Europeanisation a rather new concept, scholars have not yet been able to con-
duct a thorough investigation of the effects of EU policy on the member states over a longer 
period of time (Vink, 2002:12). But what constitutes a longer period of time? A question 
which is hard to answer, but considering that  history matters  in such a significant manner 
within HI, it must mean that the impact of EU policy on member states should be traced back 
to represent at least a vast historical period within the context of the EU (Knill, 2001:23). As 
our analysis stretches over ten years, we should be able to include certain aspects of HI, such 
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as path dependency or the importance policy legacy when analysing asylum and migration 
policies. 
When taking a sociological institutionalist perspective emphasis will  be put on the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ and thus norms, formal and informal rules and collective understandings, 
which will exert adaptational pressure on domestic-level processes, if they do not conform to 
other norms. In SI it is pointed out that domestic change is  a result of socialisation and col-
lective learning process that result in internalisation of norms and development of new identit-
ies (Börzel & Risse, 2003:58-59).
However, from a rational institutionalist  perspective, a ‘misfit’ between European and do-
mestic policies will empower certain political actors with the ability to pursue their own in-
terests,  and  therefore  emphasis  will  be  put  on  the  ‘logic  of  consequentiality’  which 
characterises actors’ behaviour within RCI (March & Olsen, 2004:20). As a result, European-
isation processes in a rationalist logic will inevitably lead to “domestic change through a dif-
ferential  empowerment  of  actors  resulting  from a  redistribution  of  resources  at  domestic  
level” (Börzel & Risse, 2003:58).
Börzel and Risse conclude that the adaptational pressure from the EU is not sufficient to ex-
plain domestic change alone. Hence, the theoretical approaches of the three new institutional-
isms help us identify and explain the behaviour  of different  mediating factors  (Börzel  & 
Risse, 2003:58) which will be introduced in section 5.1.2.
4.2.2 Defining Europeanisation
The concept of Europeanisation needs to be clarified to avoid any misinterpretations, as to 
some extent a very broad array of processes can be labelled Europeanisation. As explained be-
fore, Europeanisation deals with the consequences of EU membership on the individual mem-
ber states. There have been many attempts to clearly define the concept in brief sentences. An 
early definition provided by Ladrech is:
“A process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dy -
namics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making.” (Ladrech 1994:69 
in Featherstone & Radaelli 2003:30).
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This  early definition has  a  clear  analytical  direction  from the  European Community to  a 
change at the national level. The definition delivers an unclear scope for defining the change 
and thus only narrows it down to ‘organisational logic’. To broaden the perspective we intro-
duce  general  terms we have  the basic  understanding of  Europeanisation  as  developed by 
Héritier:
‘A process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ policies and polit-
ical administration’. (Héritier, 2001:3).
This definition takes into account both the multiplicity and diversity of Europeanisation and 
clarifies where these changes take place. To further elaborate on the definition of the pro-
cesses in which the structures that bring about these changes are to be studied, it is worth 
mentioning how Risse, Cowles and Caporaso intend Europeanisation as
“[...]the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is,  
of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interac-
tions among the actors,  and of  policy networks specializing in  the creation of  authoritative  European  
rules’”(Risse, Cowles & Caporaso in Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003:29).
In this definition, Europeanisation is understood as institution-building at the EU-level and as 
the outcome such institutions trigger at the member state level. In order to apply this concept 
analytically we need to distinguish between policy, politics and polity. For this distinction, we 
refer to section 4.6.
The  definition  of  Europeanisation  remains  fairly  open;  therefore  we  briefly  delimit  the 
concept in the following.
Europeanisation  should  not  be  confused with  EU harmonisation.  Europeanisation  induces 
policy, politics and polity change in the member states; however, these changes are adopted 
and implemented differently in each of the different member states. Harmonisation entails 
common standards and is intended to reduce regulatory diversity; europeanisation is much 
more diverse and thus leaves space for diversity at a national level (Börzel & Risse, 2003:60).
The presented definition of Europeanisation gives an overall understanding of the concept and 
some analytical tools to understand the process. An essential element in a research pertains to 
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how to interpret  a definition and how to utilise its strengths and foresee and counteract its 
weaknesses.  In  the  following  sections  we  conceptualise  a  typology  designed  to  explore 
Europeanisation’s effect on Italian migration policies.
4.2.3 Outcome - degrees of change
In this section we outline how the theoretical outcomes of Europeanisation can be measured 
in terms of 'degrees of change'.
Börzel and Risse outline three possible outcomes of Europeanisation that can be used analyt-
ically to distinguish between different outcomes and differentiate the degree of impact on the 
member states. The three possible outcomes, absorption, accommodation and transformation, 
can be used to measure ‘how much change’ and its profoundness is caused by Europeanisa-
tion. Radaelli makes similar distinctions, whereof two of them add nuances that we find use-
ful for this project, retrenchment and inertia. In the following, the five different outcomes are 
elaborated:
- Inertia is characterised by a lack of change. This can mean the lack of implementation of EU 
policies or legislation in domestic policy or legislation. Inertia manifest in lags, delays in 
transposition of directives and resistance to changes imposed by EU. In the long run inertia 
can become impossible to sustain economically and politically. The term inertia is generally 
used to define a delay in the Europeanisation process.
-  Absorption  takes  place when certain  policy requirements  are  followed without  any real 
modification of national policy. Domestic structures and policy legacy provide a mixture of 
resilience and flexibility. Some superficial changes are adopted, but the core aspects of the 
policy remains unchanged. Absorption is defined by a low degree of domestic change.
- Accommodation describes a stronger change than absorption since it depicts a deeper change 
in domestic policy. The member state accommodates the pressure for Europeanisation by ad-
opting existing processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential feature. At 
the same time, the measures adopted do not constitute a drastic change to the approach of the 
national  policies  hitherto pursued.  Therefore,  the  original  national  political  principles  and 
premises remain intact. The degree of domestic change is moderate.
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- Transformation describes not only a fundamental change in policy, politics or polity. Trans-
formation depicts a fundamental change or reorganisation of the principles and premises of 
national policy, politics and polity in a given sector. The degree of domestic change is high.
- Retrenchment is defined as a rather paradoxical effect of Europeanisation, namely when na-
tional policies become less European than they were before, as a consequence of domestic 
resistance to EU policies in a given sector.
(Radaelli, 2003:37; Börzel & Risse, 2003:70).
These  five  degrees  of  change  can  help  us  qualify  what  level  of  change  the  process  of 
Europeanisation entail on a national level: low, moderate or high; at the same time, they ac-
count for situations in which the change does not take place, due to inertia or retrenchment.
Probably, the most essential aspect of the above-mentioned outcomes is how to account for 
their  empirical  measurement.  By using objective indicators,  it  is  possible to examine and 
measure whether a member state has been 'Europeanised' or not, but the researcher needs to 
be aware that Europeanisation is a process and not an end goal; therefore measurement de-
pends mostly on the interpretative skills of the researcher (Radaelli, 2003:38). However, this 
needs to be backed up by sufficient background material and official source documents de-
picting the possible change or no change.
On the analytical level we examine to what degree the Italian asylum and migration policy 
has been influenced by the EU efforts in creating a common asylum and migration policy. 
Throughout the analysis we will compare and discuss how it has developed since 1997 and up 
to now, employing these degrees of change.
4.2.4 Mechanisms of Europeanisation
In this section we will explain the different mechanisms of change that serve to understand how the  
above mentioned degrees of change take place.
Radaelli expresses different views on certain mechanisms of Europeanisation, which can be 
combined and divided into two types: vertical and horizontal mechanisms. The vertical mech-
anisms  of  Europeanisation  are  founded on ‘hard-law’ instruments  and draw a  direct  line 
between the EU level, where policies are defined, and the domestic level, where policies are 
to be implemented. This mechanism is frequently based on adaptational pressure obliging the 
member states to adapt and comply with EU policies (Radaelli, 2003:41). Vertical mechan-
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isms take place when a certain EU model is prescribed and thus the member states are to ap-
ply that model to their institutions and policy areas. Within the description of these mechan-
isms lie the assumption that the EU policy has a precise direction and that it aims at producing 
a specific compliance at the domestic level. The vertical mechanisms are based on ‘hard’ in-
struments of EU policy, such as directives, regulations, decisions and rulings by the European 
Court of Justice (Radaelli, 2003:43). 
The area of asylum and migration after the Amsterdam treaty came under the first pillar of 
EU-cooperation and therefore strengthened common decisions competencies and the Com-
mission’s role in this issue (Vevstad, 2008:65). The Amsterdam treaty is thus the basis for the 
development of the common European asylum and refugee policy, and it is self evident that 
we shall focus some of our attention to the vertical mechanisms of Europeanisation that could 
exercise an adaptational pressure on Italy’s domestic policy on this issue. 
The  horizontal  mechanisms  of  Europeanisation  are  not  based  on  ‘hard  law’ instruments, 
which make them more difficult to define, as they are not as clearly demarcated as the vertical 
ones. Instead, the horizontal mechanisms describe Europeanisation as a process without any 
pressure to adopt EU policies. Contrary to the vertical mechanisms the horizontal ones in-
volve different forms of adjustments based on markets or on different patterns of socialisa-
tion. This process is described as domestic change triggered by the market, by diffusion of 
ideas and by discourses about ‘good policy’ and ‘best practice’ (Radaelli, 2003:41). European-
isation is therefore driven by various factors. In some cases, recommendations from EU insti-
tutions can also provide additional legitimacy for domestic reformers or actors, which can 
push forward convergence or harmonisation between member states. Additionally, new ideas 
and solutions from Brussels can alter the domestic perception of problems and their solutions, 
which can be highly influential  when national leaders engage in major reforms (Radaelli, 
2003:43). A fitting example is the governance structure for promoting convergence and best 
practice called the 'Open Method for Coordination' (OMC), which increasingly uses the EU as 
a policy transfer platform rather than the law-making system (‘hard law’). In practice, this 
method takes place with the European Commission or another EU institution setting specific 
guidelines, combined with timetables and action-plans with benchmarking, sharing of best 
practices, evaluations and peer reviews. This process in practice strongly pushes towards con-
vergence  between  the  member  states  (Radaelli,  2003:43).  The  processes  of  horizontal 
Europeanisation can, however, be more arbitrary than this example.
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4.2.5 Goodness of fit
To further explain how and why adaptational pressure emerges we make use of the concept of 
‘goodness of fit’, that can deepen the theoretical understanding and allow us to make some 
theoretical distinctions.
The expression goodness of fit is usually used by statisticians to describe how well a statistic-
al  model  fits  a  set  of  observation,  and it  is  typically used  to  summarise  the  discrepancy 
between observed values and the values expected under  the model in question.  However, 
Börzel and Risse uses the expression to explain the process of Europeanisation. The general 
idea takes point of departure in the before-mentioned adaptational pressure from the EU level. 
Europeanisation only matters when there is divergence and incompatibility (misfit) between 
the EU-level decisions, institutional processes, politics and policies, and the domestic level of 
the member state (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 59).
The level of fit is essential when explaining the relation between adaptational pressure and 
domestic change; if the level of fit is high – i.e. the domestic policies or institutions in a given 
area have a high resemblance to those of the EU-policies or institutions – the adaptational 
pressure is low and it is relatively easy for the member state to absorb minor changes. On the 
other hand, if the level of misfit between the EU-level and the domestic level is high, the ad-
aptational pressure on the member state is higher and it is harder for the member state to ab-
sorb changes (Börzel & Risse,  2003:61).
With regard to Italy the argument ‘goodness of fit’ becomes somewhat problematic, because 
the domestic institutions are fragile and have been in crisis or a form of transition for more 
than a decade. For these reasons, questions are raised on whether these institutions have been 
able to play the pivotal role they are ascribed to theoretically: that the actors capable of fen-
cing and shaping the process of Europeanisation (Hine, 2001: 25). 
The concept of ‘goodness of fit’ needs to be further elaborated in order to facilitate its analyt-
ical application.
Börzel and Risse make the distinction between policy misfit and institutional misfit, which we 
find relevant as it enable us separate the two areas and hence make the analysis and the find-
ings more accurate.
The level of policy fit/misfit can be used to describe the compatibility of rules and regulations 
between the EU level and the domestic level. Policy misfit means problems of compliance, 
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where EU policies challenge national policy goals, regulatory standards, minimum require-
ments, instruments or techniques. The policy misfit can also induce adaptational pressure on 
domestic institutions, it should however, not be confused with institutional misfit. The latter is 
described as European rules, procedures and decisions that challenge and (over time) change 
domestic institutions and institutional set-ups, which eventually alter the policy making power 
of the domestic actors (Börzel & Risse, 2003:61-62).
4.2.6 Defining policy, polity and politics
Continuing on the above mentioned division of ‘goodness of fit’ into a policy and institutional 
level, we briefly outline Börzel and Risses’ distinctions of the domestic effects of European-
isation. Börzel and Risse divide the effects into three categories: policy, politics, and polity. 
Policy  entails  standards,  regulatory  set-ups,  instruments,  problem-solving  approaches  and 
policy narratives and narratives.
Politics entails  processes of interest  formation,  interest  aggregation,  interest  representation 
and public discourse.
Polity is defined as political institutions, intergovernmental relations, judicial structures, pub-
lic administration, state traditions, economic institutions, state-society relation and collective 
identities. (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 60).
It is important to sharply categorise these three definitions in order to facilitate a coherent 
analysis of the Europeanisation of a given law or area. Defining the categories allows the re-
searcher to single out the relationship between 1) the independent variable – the EU asylum 
and migration policy, 2) the mediating variable and 3) the dependent variable – in this case 
the Italian asylum and migration policy.
In our analysis we study Italian asylum and migration policy, while we consider both politics 
and polity formal and informal mediating factors that influence the outcome. This approach 
allows us to examine causal relations between the EU policy making process on the one hand 
and how it adapted in Italy on the other. In the following chapter we highlight the mediating 
factors that we find relevant for our analysis. 
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4.2.7 Italian migration and asylum policy – the variable 
In our analysis we study Italian asylum and migration policy, while we consider both politics 
and polity formal and informal mediating factors that influence the outcome. Thus, we will 
not focus on changes in the politics, which derives from the interaction between different act-
ors, nor on changes in the polity, since we are not interested in changes of the institutional set-
up that influence policy decisions.
Furthermore, we focus on how Italy's policy is influenced by policy-making at EU level. Ac-
cordingly, the EU policy on migration and asylum is the independent  variable and taken as 
given, while the Italian policy is the dependent variable, as its changes are influenced by de-
cisions taken at EU level. 
Polity and politics are nevertheless relevant variables, as mediating factors, because they in-
fluence the adoption of policy changes at Italian level. Therefore, we will only consider the 
roles of politics and polity as mediating factors, without looking into changes directly occur-
ring in these areas.
This approach allows us to examine causal relations between the EU policy making process 
on the one hand and how it adapted in Italy on the other. In the following chapter we highlight 
the mediating factors that we find relevant for our analysis. 
4.2.8 Mediating factors
The different national outcomes of European integration can be explained by different mediat-
ing factors relating to the process of Europeanisation. In this section we introduce the concept 
of intervening variables that mediate, press forward, delay, distort or block the implementa-
tion and incorporation of the EU-output at the national level. These intervening variables are 
essential to understand the process of Europeanisation. In fact, mediating factors play a cent-
ral role in the national adaptation process (Börzel & Risse, 2003:58).
In contemporary academic literature on the study of Europeanisation, four overarching ex-
planatory variables are identified: 1) political and institutional capacity, 2) political and insti-
tutional  tradition,  3)  veto-  and  mediation-points  and  4)  culture  of  compliance  (Kelstrup, 
Martinsen & Wind, 2008:329). Due to their clear distinction and straightforward definitions, 
which facilitates an analytical application, these four categories will be applied throughout the 
project.
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Political and institutional capacity
The term political and institutional capacity considers as a mediating factor to what extent a 
given member state’s structural organisation supports or hinders the adaptation of a given EU 
decision. This capacity is described first and foremost as a question of the member state’s 
political and institutional structure and its capability of managing outside change. In this as-
pect, the level of centralisation/autonomy, of parliamentary rule and of majority/minority gov-
ernments are essential (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:330). 
Political and institutional tradition
The definition political and institutional tradition depicts how national institutions that have 
been shaped in the course of time are determining how the country responds to a EU decision 
or initiative that is presumed to have an influence on the established institutional legacy or or-
ganisational structure. Generally, this means that if the EU output is challenging the existing 
national institutional traditions and interests, it is logical to presume that the decision is imple-
mented with resistance (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:331). 
Veto and mediation points 
The existence of multiple veto points is  often highlighted as a central  dependent variable 
when mediation of EU processes is described.
The term 'veto-point' generally describes when important national actors mobilise in resist-
ance to the adaptation of a given EU decision (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:331). The 
political power is usually distributed among different national actors who may have a prevail-
ing influence on decision making: this makes it difficult to obtain the national consensus ne-
cessary to introduce the changes that correspond with the EU decision. The more the political 
power is distributed among the political actors, the more veto-points exist and hence the more 
difficult becomes the integration of the EU decision in the domestic arena (Börzel & Risse, 
2003:64).
The actors can consist of a variety of interest groups such as labour unions, employer associ-
ations, industry organisation, environmental organisations, minority organisations. In a broad 
understanding these actors also include politicians – e.g. the opposition –  and the media and 
the press which often play a decisive role in this process. 
The interest groups are often described as potential blocking factors of in adaptation of EU 
decisions, but in fact they are the opposite but can also have the opposite role of facilitating 
change. Interest groups can also be described as mediating points, since they often report to 
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the EU when politicians or the administrative do not comply with EU decisions or rulings 
therefore triggering pressure from the EU (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:331).
Compliance Culture
The notion of compliance culture encompasses the assumption that there is not only one way 
of transposing and implementing EU decisions in the domestic policies, but that the individu-
al member states have different attitudes towards the importance and need for complying to 
EU decisions. Compliance culture is used to describe how national political and economic 
priorities are valued against the need to comply with EU decisions. These priorities are de-
termined by embedded cultures in the political institutions and the administration (Kelstrup, 
Martinsen & Wind, 2008:332). Falkner has drawn up typologies of compliance culture which 
are termed 'three worlds of compliance': (1)'World of law observance' is where a EU decision 
is in principle regarded as superior to domestic priorities and transposed to national law. A na-
tional political conflict or a strong opposition against the EU decision usually doesn't impede 
the transposition of EU decisions. The (2) 'world of domestic politics' is characterised by an 
ambivalent approach to EU decisions which means that compliance is not a goal in itself  
when domestic actors decide whether or not to implement the it in national law. This decision 
is often made on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, if the EU decision clashes with national 
interests it will usually not be implemented. In the (3) 'world of neglect' compliance is by no 
means a goal in itself in neither political processes or in the administration which usually is 
caused by lack of will and sometimes by lack of administrative capabilities. According to 
Falkner, Italy is often grouped within this last archetype of the typology. (Falkner, Treib & 
Hartlapp in Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:332-333).
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5. Operationalisation
In this  chapter  we present  how we will  apply the theory in  order  to  analyse how Italian 
asylum and migration policies are influenced by developments at the EU level.
5.1 Interpreting the outcomes of Europeanisation
In this section we will explain how the five categories introduced in the theoretical part will 
be specifically interpreted and applied to our case study. We will not refer to factual examples, 
but rather trace some guidelines that will help us classifying when a case pertains to any of 
the five different categories.
A methodological note should be made, regarding the conception of time and the applicability 
of these categories to a time span such as the one considered in this project. If these theoretic -
al tools are very helpful in analysing the status quo of a policy adoption, they don't allow to 
interpret processes taking time into account.
While helping defining when we are witnessing a case of, for instance, inertia, such categories 
don't provide an indication of time. Hence, how much time should pass before inertia can be 
claimed, is a question that is not answered. Processes of policy adoption and implementation 
require time, but there is no specific threshold to indicate whether the national government 
had or had not had enough time to reshape the domestic policies or institutions. Therefore, it 
is according to the researcher to decide, looking at the different factors, whether a specific 
case can be labelled as inertia or there has simply not been enough time to adopt new policies 
at the national level. In this project's analysis, we will, where possible, look at when changes 
have happened on the national level, and whether or not they included the principles that are 
expressed by previously shaped EU policies. If an intervention on the national law and institu-
tions takes place after a change in the EU policy, we will expect these changes to be related 
(in whichever of the five different ways offered by the theoretical tools) to the EU policy. Us-
ing the above presented example of inertia, failure in adapting to the EU policy and in ad-
dressing its principles in the first following national intervention on migration and asylum 
policies, will be labelled as inertia. To better highlight in the analysis the progress of EU and 
national policies, we will, within the three areas previously identified, use a chronological ap-
proach, to point out the causality of changes and their relation to previous interventions. 
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Being the term inertia used to define a delay in the Europeanisation process, we will identify 
this category in those situation in which, despite a policy change at the EU level, the Italian 
government hasn't defined new laws, mechanisms and institutions that would comply with the 
EU suggestions or regulations. It is important to note how, when the formal adoption of a new 
policy (through laws, decrees, regulations, etc...) is not followed by the creation (or the neces-
sary changes) of the mechanisms or institutions that make the actual implementation of the 
policy realisable, the case will still be considered as inertia, as the factual implementation of 
the policy hasn't taken place. Obviously, in a case in which the policies were already existing 
at the national level (together with the mechanisms and institutions) and therefore we see no 
change, we cannot classify the case as inertia.
The term absorption describes a low degree of domestic change. Therefore, we will identify 
absorption when the adoption of policies emanated at the EU level is pursued through minor 
changes in Italian regulations. The simple introduction of a reference to EU legislation in the 
already existing domestic norm can constitute absorption, as well as a different interpretation 
given to an already existing norm or a partial shift in the role of an institution in order to com-
ply with the new policy in question.  
In this study, the classification of a case as accommodation will take place when new laws are 
made or new mechanisms and institutions are put in place, in order to comply with EU regula-
tions or guidelines. This can be easily traceable when new legislative tools or institutions are 
created at the Italian level and if  they contain the same principles of the corresponding EU 
regulations. A case can be classified as accommodation when there has been a change in do-
mestic policy due to Europeanisation processes, that does not conflict with the previous do-
mestic policies. If the new policies shift from previous patterns, the case will be classified as 
transformation.
In order for transformation to take place, the polity and politics levels should change as well, 
creating the political space for such a drastic change. In this project we will identify a case as 
transformation when, following a change of policy at the EU level, drastic reforms are made 
at the Italian level. These can include organic reforms, decrees or laws that constitute a break-
ing point from the previous national policies, following a different orientation in the handling 
of migration and asylum related issues. This can be triggered and made possible by a change 
in the formal mediating factors (e.g. change of government, change of approach to the issue 
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by the same government, re-shaping of parliamentary majority), as well as by a change in the 
informal mediating factors (e.g. societal norms, perception of the social and/or economical 
role of migrants within the society, increased/decreased need for foreign labour). In the case 
of a transformation, we will try and outline the changes of the mediating factors, without 
which the drastic changes would have probably not happened in the first place.
We will identify retrenchment in the case of emanation of legislative tools or creation of insti-
tutions at the Italian level that pursue policies that are in clear opposition of the EU policies. 
Such a change can take place as a consequence and as a reaction to new EU policies that are  
considered “not acceptable” at the national level, but it can also follow a shift in the position 
of the mediating factors. A consistent shift internal to these factors (e.g. change of govern-
ment; different perception of the issue by the general public, following events that received 
intensive media coverage) can be the trigger of a domestic policy change that retrenches from 
positions that, until then, were more in line with EU policies and principles.
5.1.1 Application of the categories
During  the  analysis,  we  will  apply  these  five  categories  to  calculate  the  level  of  misfit 
between the specific mechanisms of hard and soft law used by the EU and their adoption in 
Italy. It is worth noting that many of these policies are highly interconnected with each other, 
and that a research that analyses them one at a time without connecting the dots would be an 
incomplete research. Therefore we will try to evaluate, at the end of each section, what the 
level of the misfit of the entire area should be considered. We will apply once more these five 
categories to the area, rather than to single mechanisms, keeping in mind that the result in this 
case might not be as sharp, since different parts of a policy could be (mis)fitting differently 
than others. However, we consider necessary this exercise, in order to obtain a higher under-
standing of the policy area as a whole, rather than the adoption of single and atomised parts of 
it.
5.1.2 Mediating factors
As introduced in the theory chapter, mediating factors can be classified as four different kinds 
of variables: 1) political and institutional capacity, 2) political and institutional tradition, 3) 
veto- and mediation-points and 4) culture of compliance (as seen in section 4.2.8).
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In this section we will highlight the Italian mediating factors corresponding to these categor-
ies. These will later be used in the analysis to explain how an identified misfit identified has 
come about.
As political and institutional capacity, the role of the government and parties constituting the 
parliamentary majority is absolutely vital, as the primary institutional mediating factors in-
volved. Being the governments of the period studied characterised by vast coalitions that en-
compass different political traditions and different interests, it is expectable that on certain 
issues specific parties in the governing majority would try to impose their specific agenda. 
Salvati  (2004:61)  and  Paolucci  and  Newell  (2008:286)  for  the  centre-left  and  Donovan 
(2004:76) for the centre-right, have shown how the two major coalitions often carry big in-
ternal tensions and divisions, and how these tensions can reach the point of threatening the 
very existence of the coalition and of the governing majority. In this perspective, we can con-
sider the particular interests of the individual governing parties as a very important variable in 
the adoption of EU policies at the national level.
As political and institutional tradition we will consider the political traditions regarding mi-
gration and asylum policies and practices present on the Italian level. In calculating this vari-
able, we cannot exclude the traditional opposition to active policies of immigration and the 
use of regularisations to legalise irregular migrants already on the national territory. Finotelli 
and Sciortino point out that:
“[...] the informal economy is part of a civic culture which is very tolerant towards irregular employment.  
For these reasons, struggling effectively against this phenomenon would also mean interfering in the com-
plicated relationship between State and Society. ” (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2008:6).
Another  element  that  cannot  be  excluded  is  the  traditional  lack  of  legislation  regarding 
asylum seekers and asylum seeking procedures (FIDH, 2005:8). These  political traditions  
will therefore be considered as an important variable in our analysis.
Veto-points are an important variable that deserves much attention and analysis. As they are 
classified  as  “national  actors  [that]  mobilise  resistance  to  adaptation  of  a  given  EU-
decision” (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:331), their identification is central in order to 
point out who opposes the adoption and implementation of EU policies.
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In the Italian case, these veto-points lie both in non-governmental institutions and within the 
society. In the first group we can gather institutions such as the Catholic church and groups 
such as industry or employer associations. These groups have different roles and mobilise for 
different reasons, but have in common an interest on the outcome of migration and asylum 
policies. The interest of the Catholic church is mostly based on its principles of solidarity to-
wards  the  migrants,  and  the  widespread  religious  activism in  the  field  (see  Colombo  & 
Sciortino, 2003:201) can be brought as an evidence of the fact. Its role also consists in the 
shaping of the norms of those parts of the Italian society that identify with its values. Among  
these,  it is reasonable to assume that parties that openly call themselves Catholic, are influ-
enced by the values push forward by the church. Industry associations or employer groups are 
clearly moved by a different interest, but the need for foreign labour in the Italian economy 
(and particularly in the informal economy) is a valid reason for pushing towards policies (and 
opposing others)  that  would  facilitate  the  recruitment  of  workers  (Colombo & Sciortino, 
2004:774-775).
In the second group are included the norms that lie in Italian society and that determine the 
perception of migration and asylum policies through different perceptions of migrants and 
asylum seekers. Such norms play an important role as they are widespread in society, and rep-
resent a general feeling that often cannot be ignored by politicians, especially considering the 
material leverage of vote gain and loss. Finotelli & Sciortino (2008:1-2) point out how the 
perception of irregular migrants is often negative as they are linked with criminality.  The 
same can be inferred by studies on the portrait of migrants through Italian media, that focus 
on crimes and problems caused by migrations rather than on integration, life style and culture 
of these same migrants. As Corte points out, it is not exclusively irregular migrants that are 
portrayed  negatively,  but  migrants  in  general,  as  their  role  in  Italian  media  is  limited  to 
criminality reports and clandestine arrivals (Corte, 2002). Particularly, the lexicon used by the 
media promotes the idea of an “invasion”, a “wave” of clandestine migrants that are attempt-
ing to illegally cross Italian sea borders to arrive on Italian soil (Corte, 2002:9; Andrijasevic, 
2009:156; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:172).
Such a various array of veto-points will be helpful in explaining the processes that have medi-
ated EU policies and their outcome on the Italian level.
The concept of compliance culture regards the tradition of compliance to EU policies that a 
country has. While Falkner highlights how Italy belongs to the 'world of neglect'  (Falkner, 
Treib & Hartlapp in Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind, 2008:332-333), Quaglia and Radaelli point 
35
out how the Italian case in the time frame at study has been characterised by a “political pen-
dulum” (Quaglia & Radaelli, 2007:927). The two centre-left governments that governed from 
1996 to 2001 and again from 2006 to 2008 have been using the pressure coming from the EU 
level as a tool to foster change at a domestic level, therefore attempting to comply to EU 
policies. On the other hand, the Berlusconi governments (1996 and again from 2001-2006) 
have tried to reduce the EU influence to  a minimum, pursuing domestic  policies without 
much attention to (and often in open conflict with) Brussels (Quaglia & Radaelli, 2007:930). 
It is legitimate to assume that, not having the new Berlusconi government (2008 - still gov-
erning)  been characterised by major changes  in its  formation,  the same patterns could be 
found in its third mandate.
Throughout the analysis, this concept should be considered as an always present variable, be-
ing Italy in general characterised by a scarce commitment to compliance.
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6.  Development  of  EU  Immigration  and  Asylum 
Policies
This chapter will briefly summarise the key points of the development of immigration and 
asylum policy at EU level which are relevant for this project, creating the basis for the analyt-
ical comparison which will follow in a later chapter.
6.1 The beginning of cooperation on asylum, immigration and ex-
ternal border control 
In 1990, while cooperation between the member states was still intergovernmental and in-
formal,  the Dublin Convention was introduced. Through the Dublin Convention the member 
states decided that asylum seekers shall only be allowed to have their cases reviewed in the 
first EU member state they reach and that if an asylum seeker was rejected once by one mem-
ber  state,  he  or  she  should  not  be  allowed  to  seek  asylum  in  any  other  EU  country 
(Rasmussen, 1997:157). 
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty provided the legal basis and an institutional framework for the 
intergovernmental cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs between EU member states, by 
creating the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) in the Treaty on European Union. How-
ever, no common objectives were agreed on.
6.2 The Amsterdam Treaty
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (which came into force in 1999) signs a major step in the policy 
development, with the incorporation of immigration, asylum and external border control is-
sues into the European Community, the first pillar of the Treaty on European Union. There-
with  competences  were  transferred  to  the  EU,  and  asylum,  immigration,  and  control  of 
external borders became subject to the Community method and a shared competence between 
the EU and the member states. 
The Amsterdam Treaty provided specific objectives as well as a deadline for their achieve-
ment, but, instead of explicitly aiming at the establishment of a 'common asylum and immig-
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ration policy',  it  selects certain specific issues for more specific action (Monar, 2001:271-
272).
Further important changes brought by the Amsterdam Treaty were the incorporation of the 
Schengen Convention into the EU framework, and the new competence of the EU for entering 
into agreements with third countries in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. 
After the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, the EU was facing the challenge of imple-
menting the new possibilities it provided. Therefore, the Commission issued a Communica-
tion on the development of the new 'area of freedom, security and justice' (COM(1998)459), 
which later became the basis for an 'Action Plan' on the implementation of the provisions of  
the Amsterdam Treaty on the same area (OJ No. C 19/1 of 23.1.1999), that was adopted by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council in 1998 in Vienna (Monar, 2001:287).
The Commission Communication calls for more action in the area of asylum and international 
protection beyond the definitions of the 1951 Geneva Convention, as the normal asylum pro-
cedures are regarded as not sufficient in the case of a mass-influx of people seeking interna-
tional protection, and due to the need for  “subsidiary forms of protection for people whose  
individual cases demonstrate a need for protection despite the fact that they are not refugees  
under the Geneva Convention” (COM(1998)459:7).
Additionally, the Vienna Action Plan mentions explicitly the separation of the areas of asylum 
and immigration and recognises the need for separate approaches. More precisely, the Action 
Plan determines  that  minimum standards on temporary and subsidiary protection shall  be 
defined as soon as possible and that the adoption of minimum standards on procedures for 
granting or withdrawing refugee status and defining minimum standards on the reception of 
asylum seekers shall be taken within two years. Furthermore, it calls for the establishment of 
a coherent EU policy on readmission and return, accompanied by other measures to combat 
illegal immigration and measures to improve “the possibilities for the removal of persons  
who have been refused the right to stay” (OJ No. C 19/1 of 23.1.1999:9).
Beyond that,  it was decided to hold a European Council summit especially dedicated to the 
implementation of Justice and Home Affairs. 
The Tampere European Council summit in 1999 had the area of asylum and immigration as 
one of its main concerns (Monar, 2001:290). Its conclusions defined four major elements to 
establish a 'common EU asylum and migration policy'. First of all, partnership with countries 
of  origin  and  transit  should  focus  on  political,  human  rights  and  development  issues. 
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Secondly, a 'common European asylum system' shall be established embracing common min-
imum standards, common procedures, rules and forms of subsidiary protection, as presented 
in the Amsterdam Treaty and the Vienna Action Plan. Moreover, the European Council accen-
tuates “the importance the Union and Member States attach to absolute respect of the right to  
seek asylum” and “the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring  
that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement” 
(Tampere  European  Council,  1999:Conclusion  13). A further  element  of  a  common  EU 
asylum and migration policy should be the fair treatment of  third country nationals legally 
residing in the member states with regard to integration policies, rights and non-discrimina-
tion. At last the European Council Conclusions address the need for more effective manage-
ment  of  migration  flows,  the  conclusion  of  readmission  agreement  and  assistance  for 
countries of origin and transit.
The Tampere European Council was a significant step shaping the direction of immigration 
and  asylum policy.  Both  the  Vienna  Action  Plan  and  the  Tampere  Programme  were  the 
guidelines for the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty by the Commission and Council. 
6.3 Development of common migration and asylum policies
After the direction of the policy area was set, directives on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced person (2001/55/EC) and with 
regard to illegal immigration a directive to guarantee the mutual recognition of expulsion de-
cision  on  third  country  nationals  (2001/40/EC)  were  agreed  on.   The  Council  Directive 
2001/40/EC main purpose was
 “to make possible the recognition of an expulsion decision issued by a competent authority in one Member  
State, [...] "issuing Member State", against a third country national present within the territory of another  
Member State, [...] "enforcing Member State"” (2001/40/EC:art.1).
Furthermore, the Commission launched a Communication on a common policy for actions to 
prevent and combat illegal immigration (COM(2001)672) embracing the areas of visa policy, 
infrastructure for information exchange, cooperation and coordination, border management, 
police cooperation, aliens law and criminal law, and return and readmission policy. The Com-
munication emphasises that actions in countries of origin should be promoted and supported 
(also financially) by the EU in accordance with the EU policy on human rights. At the same 
time, transit countries shall be supported in dealing with migrants and refugees. It also states 
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that a regularisation of irregular migrants should not be part of the actions against irregular 
immigration despite the needs of the legal labour markets in the member states: “Illegal entry  
or residence should not lead to the desired stable form of residence” (COM(2001)672:6). It 
follows that readmission and return policy is the EU priority for dealing with migrants illeg-
ally residing in the member states. Regarding readmission agreements with third countries, 
the Communication determines that the political and human rights situation in the country in 
question should be considered before entering into any readmission negotiations.
Despite the strong emphasis on the need to combat illegal immigration effectively, the Com-
mission Communication also mentions that the according measures need to take account of 
member states' obligations to provide international protection. In this respect, it directly refers 
to Article 31 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees saying that:
“[...] states shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, com-
ing directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or  
are present in their territory without authorisation, provided they present themselves without delay to the  
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” (COM(2001)672:7).
In the same year the Council of the European Union presented its 'conclusions on measures to 
be applied to prevent and combat illegal immigration and smuggling and trafficking in human 
beings by sea and in particular on measures against third countries which refuse to cooperate 
with the European Union in preventing and combating these phenomena'.
In its conclusions the Council acknowledges the increased illegal immigration by sea and the 
necessity of cooperation with countries of boarding, departure or transit of these flows. Illegal 
immigration flows should entail an early political response by the EU including measures re-
garding countries of boarding, departure or transit, aiming at joint control of migration flows. 
Moreover, the Council sets out several measures to be adopted by these third countries in or-
der to prevent and combat smuggling and trafficking of human beings by sea including the 
signing of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees among others. 
The European Council meeting in Seville in 2002 reaffirmed the aims set out in the Tampere 
Programme and expressed the wish to speed up its implementation. To this end, the European 
Council  determined several  deadlines for the adoption of legislation regarding a common 
policy on asylum and immigration. It was pointed out that leading action needs to be in ac-
cordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention, and furthermore, that it is important to ensure 
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refugees quick and effective protection and, for those whose asylum application has been re-
jected, the return to their countries of origin should be protected. 
The Thessaloniki European Council in 2003 addressed the area of asylum and immigration 
with a broader view than the Seville European Council by dividing it into three main sections: 
(1) 'the development of a common policy on illegal immigration, external borders, the return 
of illegal migrants and cooperation with third countries', (2) 'asylum' and (3) 'the development 
of a policy at European Union level on the integration of third country nationals legally resid-
ing in the territory of the European Union'. It further stated that a more structured EU policy 
would be required, including the whole spectrum of migration and asylum issues. Regarding 
external border management the European Council invited the Commission to examine “the 
necessity of creating new institutional mechanisms, including the possible creation of a Com-
munity operational structure, in order to enhance operational cooperation for the manage-
ment of external borders”  (Seville European Council Presidency Conclusions, 2003:5). On 
this basis the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the Ex-
ternal Borders of the member states of the EU (Frontex) was established through Council 
Regulation No 2007/2004 in the year 2004. Its  initial  role  was purely administrative,  but 
growing numbers of irregular migrants arriving in the Mediterranean countries “have boosted 
its role in coordinating much of the frontline work” (Collett, 2008:1).
Both the Seville and Thessaloniki European Council summits demonstrate that immigration 
and asylum policy has become a strategic priority of the EU and its member states, and that  
its development and implementation is continuously pressed ahead. 
In 2003 a directive regarding family reunification (2003/86/EC) was to“determine the condi-
tions for the exercise of the right to family reunification by third country nationals residing  
lawfully in the territory of the Member States” (2003/86/EC:art.1) was adopted. Moreover the 
EU adopted a directive that sets 'minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers' 
(2003/9/EC). According to this directive, member states are obliged to allow applicants for 
asylum free movement within the member states territory. Furthermore, the member state has 
to provide the applicant with appropriate accommodation and ensure a standard of living ad-
equate for his/her health and well-being as well as that of his/her family.
In April 2004 the 'Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third-country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need in-
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ternational protection and the content of the protection granted' (2004/83/EC) was adopted. A 
further example of implementation of objectives set in the documents discussed previously is 
the council directive 'on the conditions of admission of third country nationals for the purpose 
of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service' (2004/114/EC). 
In November 2004 the European Council adopted the Hague Programme, successor of the 
Tampere Programme, which establishes the priorities for the European Union to strengthen 
freedom, security and justice for the next five year period. Immigration and asylum alongside 
prevention of terrorism were the main concerns of this programme.
The Hague Programme identified several key measures in the area of asylum and migration. 
Among these were the establishment of the European Asylum System with a common proced-
ure and uniform status for all who are granted asylum or protection, the development of part-
nership with third countries aiming at  improving asylum systems, the fight against illegal 
immigration and the implementation of  resettlement  programs and the establishment  of a 
policy on expulsion and return of irregular migrants (Hague Programme – JHA programme 
2005-10, 2005).
In 2005 after the adoption of the Hague Programme, a council directive on minimum stand-
ards  for  the  member  states'  procedures  for  granting  and  withdrawing  refugee  status 
(2005/85/EC) was adopted, which applies to all applications for asylum made on the territory 
of the member states, including borders, or in a transit zone (2005/85/EC:art.3). Moreover, a 
directive on a specific procedure for admitting third country nationals for the purpose of sci-
entific research (2005/71/EC) was adopted.
In December 2008 a directive on common standards and procedures in member states for re-
turning illegally staying third-country nationals (2008/115/EC) was adopted.
The Return Directive is a tool to organise the return of irregular migrants, while ensuring that 
they are returned with dignity and respect for their human rights. It includes caring for the 
children and a number of legal guarantees, as well as re-entry bans. Member states shall pro-
hibit the use of stricter rules to irregular migrants, but may maintain or adopt more liberal pro-
visions. In any case, EU legislation applies only after the decision by national authorities to 
deport an irregular migrant. The right to take this decision is left to the member states. If it is 
decided to expel a person, a two-step approach has to be applied. Firstly, a period of seven to 
thirty days follows for voluntary return. Secondly, if the person hasn't left the country, a re-
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moval order is issued, including an entry ban of up to five years. The soon-to-be-expelled can 
be placed in custody if the court decides that it can escape, and the directive sets a maximum 
period of detention to six months that may however be extended for a further 12 months. If a 
person is in custody following an administrative decision, a court order should be issued with-
in 48 hours. If a person may pose a threat to public life, the entry ban may be issued for a 
longer period of time. However, member states have the right to withdraw, cancel or suspend 
such bans. In a situation in which a very large number of third-country nationals affects the 
administrative or judicial capacity of a member state, the state may allow longer periods of re-
view and worse conditions of detention. Member states are obliged to take into account the 
circumstances of individual countries of origin and, according to the principle of non-refoule-
ment, no state may repatriate a refugee to a country where his or her life or liberty may be en-
dangered (Parliament adopts directive on return of illegal immigrants, 2008).
In October 2008 the European Pact on Migration and Asylum was signed. As it is not legally 
binding, the pact is rather considered as a political statement and a catalyst for debate. It con-
tains five pillars on migration and asylum, but none of these areas is new.
A major aim is to create a common EU asylum system and safe and efficient asylum proced-
ures before 2012. Furthermore the programme points out the necessity to prevent, control and 
combat illegal migration towards the EU and it introduces the principle instructing omissions 
on large-scale regularisations. migrants staying illegally in a member state should only be al-
lowed to stay and work on the basis of their individual circumstances. Regarding cooperation 
with third countries,  the Pact  also recognises  the possibility of and the need for  bilateral 
agreements beside EU level agreements (Bertozzi, 2008:2). Overall, “the Pact clearly heralds  
a more conservative approach to immigration, in line with changing public and political atti-
tudes. It looks at immigration policies through the prism of ‘control first’, making this more  
explicit than in the past” (Collett, 2008:2).
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7. Development of Italian Immigration and Asylum 
policy
In this chapter we outline development of the Italian Immigration and Asylum policies start-
ing from the middle of the 1970ies up until present day policies.
7.1 A country of emigration
Italy, as much as other Southern European countries, has a much longer history of emigration 
than one of immigration. With a peak in the years immediately prior to the First World War, it 
has in fact been calculated that over 26-million people left the country between 1876 and 
1985 (Del Boca & Venturini, 2005:304). Beginning in the mid-1970ies and more consistently 
after 1984 - with the closure of the borders to migrants in Germany, France and Britain - the 
direction of the flow reversed (Kosic & Triandafyllidou, 2007:186), changing Italy's position 
from a country of emigrants to a host and a destination country in a relatively short period of 
time, and  putting at test the capability of the country to face the new challenges posed by this 
phenomenon (Pastore, 2004:28). From less than 300,000 foreigners holding a residence per-
mit  in  1986,  the  numbers  rose  to  over  three  millions  in  2005 (Kosic  & Triandafyllidou, 
2007:188).
Italian policies on migration throughout the 20th century have been much affected by these 
trends, as since 1912 the main focus has been to make it possible for emigrated Italians (or 
their descendants) to come back to their country of origin and easily (re-)obtain citizenship 
(Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:778). Even the reform on Italian citizenship passed in 1992, 
when immigration was already a reality and had already started to be perceived as a problem, 
followed a clear principle of “ethnic preference” (Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:778). If on one 
hand this reform made it easier for descendants of Italian emigrants and for citizens of other 
European Community countries to obtain citizenship, the minimum period of uninterrupted 
residency required for other nationals before obtaining citizenship was set to ten years, doub-
ling the previous five years and imposing stricter rules compared to other European countries 
(Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:779).
With the focus being on protecting the rights of emigrated nationals, for over two decades im-
migration policies almost entirely consisted of periodical regularisations of undocumented 
migrants already residing in the country, both through individual and collective mechanisms 
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(Colombo & Sciortino, 2004). Mass regularisations took place in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 
again in 2002, and involved more than two million of undocumented migrants (Kosic & Tri-
andafyllidou, 2007:185). 
7.2 The 1990ies and the reform of migration policies
In 1990, law 39/1990 (the so-called Martelli law) approaches the immigration issue recogniz-
ing the failure of previous admission policies and the structural need for foreign workers of 
Italian economy (Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:774). The reform brought about two important 
changes from the previous policies. Firstly, the geographical reservation that had been limit-
ing the application of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention only to persons of European ori-
gin was lifted (FIDH, 2005:8). Secondly, law 39/1990 restricted the conditions of entrance 
into the country: visas became necessary for citizens of all the countries from which the im-
migration flows were originating, border control was enhanced and expulsions became not 
only a tool to repress single individuals, but a method of counteracting irregular immigration 
as a whole (Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:775). 
After the regularisation of 246,000 foreigners in 1995 (Carfagna in Colombo & Sciortino, 
2004:210), a new substantial reform was passed by the centre-left government guided by Ro-
mano Prodi in 1998. The law 40/1998 (also called with the names of its two creators: Turco-
Napolitano law) is by many considered as the first organic and ambitious law that deals with 
the migratory challenges Italy has faced since mid-1970ies (Pastore, 2008:106; Colombo & 
Sciortino, 2003:198; Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:780). The law revolves around the two key 
aspects of regulation/repression and integration. Regarding the first aspect, it introduced the 
Decreto flussi (a law decree that, more realistically than in the past, sets the acceptable legal 
flow of migrants for the year to come, together with their country of origin) and the possibil-
ity for the Italian government to sign agreements with countries where the migratory flows 
originate or transit countries, to regulate regular immigration and counteract the irregular and 
clandestine one. On the side of repression, it both gave power to police force and the Questori 
to return to their country of origin or transit migrants caught while illegally crossing the bor-
ders, and instituted the CPTA's (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza – Centres of 
temporary stay and assistance), centres where irregular migrants can be detained while await-
ing expulsion (Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:780). Regarding integration, the 1998 reform in-
stituted the concept of Carta di soggiorno (stay card), that introduced the possibility of semi-
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permanent stay for foreigners that had lived legally in the country for a certain amount of time 
(Colombo & Sciortino, 2004:781).
Despite the scarce application of some of the integrative aspects of the reform (Colombo & 
Sciortino, 2003:200-201), the number of expulsions grew consistently with the implementa-
tion of law 40/1998 and the CPTA's became soon operative and by 2002 were being used for 
more than 17.000 migrants yearly (with the figures quickly growing), allowing at least the re-
pressive aspect of Turco-Napolitano law to be considered successful in its original intentions 
(Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:200).
The Turco-Napolitano law set into place the key elements of Italian migration policy for the 
years to come, as many of its central points remained and were further developed by the fol-
lowing reform by the Berlusconi government in 2002 and in more general by the policies that 
have marked the last decade.
7.3 The Bossi-Fini law
After a long electoral campaign with much focus on migration issues, the winning centre-
right coalition, guided by Silvio Berlusconi, presented a new reform of immigration policies 
in 2002, producing law 189/2002 (also known as  Bossi-Fini  law), soon followed by a new 
regularisation of irregular migrants residing in Italy that regularised the position of more than 
700,000 people (Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:209).
The Bossi-Fini law modified certain aspects of the Turco-Napolitano reform regarding the 
role of the CPTA's and the repression of irregular immigration, but didn't intervene on the in-
tegrative aspect of the previous laws, nor did it create a new series of mechanisms (Colombo 
& Sciortino, 2003:204-205).
While abolishing the concept of visa for job researching purposes (as it was seen as a very 
difficult process to monitor) (Pastore, 2008:113), the new reform harshened the criteria to ob-
tain a visa for working reasons. Not only the visa and its duration are strictly connected to the 
duration of the working permit, making it substantially harder to legally remain in the country 
after the working contract has expired, but also more duties are given to the employers. From 
this moment onwards employers need to provide not only a job for their foreign workers, but 
also  ensure  their  accommodation  and  pay  for  their  return  trip  to  the  country  of  origin 
(Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:206). 
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Also the role of CPTA's was enhanced by law 189/2002. With the new regulation, migrants 
can be detained for up to 60 days while awaiting expulsion or their asylum application to be  
processed, and are often detained from the moment they are intercepted while crossing the 
border illegally, to the moment of their accompanied expulsion from the national territory 
(FIDH, 2005:9). In case of doubtful identity, migrants can be detained in centres of identifica-
tion (CDI's), and subsequently moved to a CPTA until their expulsion or decision on their 
asylum application (FIDH, 2005:12).
The framework provided by the the reform, later followed by law decree 241/2004, defined 
that, if the simple notification of expulsion was meant to be given only to migrants whose visa 
has expired, the accompanied expulsion would become the norm, and not respecting such an 
expulsion notice (or coming back irregularly after an expulsion) would result in a criminal of-
fence  with  arrest  up  to  a  year  the  first  time  and  up  to  four  years  any  subsequent  time 
(Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:207; Pastore, 2008:110). In practice, since CPTA's capacity is 
limited (e.g. lack of space) and since the deportation could be considered too costly or prob-
lematic due to the doubtful origin of the migrant, often an expulsion notification is issued 
with the order to leave the country within five days at the migrant's own expenses. Obviously,  
many times this order goes unattended and the migrant could be charged for up to four years 
of prison, as his/her position has changed into a criminal offence (Pastore, 2008:110). The 
duration of the expulsion decree was doubled from five to ten years and, although the migrant 
has the right to appeal, the expulsion is anyway immediate, making the appeal decision use-
less, as the migrant will  have already left  the country by the time this will come (FIDH, 
2005:16). The official objective of this new set of mechanism is the triplication of the number 
of  expulsions  by  the  time  the  system  will  be  entirely  in  place  (Colombo  &  Sciortino, 
2003:200), and in the early 2000's Italy accounted for about the 10% of the entire EU expul-
sions (CIREFI and EUROSTAT in Pastore, 2008:107).
7.4 External cooperation
Given its geographical position, Italy has had an active external policy on migration since the 
end of 1990ies, and, by 2004, repatriation agreements with 27 countries of origin or transit of 
migration flows had been signed (FIDH, 2005:17). Since 1998 Italy realised the need to make 
these deals effective through incentives given to countries willing to cooperate. With the insti-
tutions of the Decreto flussi in 1998, countries that would cooperate in controlling irregular 
migration would also receive benefits in form of the numbers of citizens that could enter the 
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country legally, given that they fell under the categories set by the current legislation (Pastore, 
2008:111).
7.4.1 The Libyan cases of 2004 and 2009 and their implications
A case that has received much national and international attention is the Italian-Libyan bilat-
eral agreement.
“Initially signed in Rome in 2000 as a general agreement to fight terrorism, organized crime and illegal  
migration, and strengthened in 2003 and 2004 via follow-up agreements, today Italian-Libyan partnership  
extends to include readmission agreement, training for Libyan police officers and border guards, and Itali -
an-funded  detention  and  repatriation  programmes  for  irregular  migrants  in  Libya.”  (Andrijasevic, 
2009:150).
The reason for this interest firstly arose in 2004, when, out of 1787 persons that arrived by 
boat to the island of Lampedusa, only 544 were transferred to nearby CPTA's, while the other 
1153 were denied access and readmitted in Libya. Besides the concerns raised by the lack of 
an  effective  identification  process  and  the  conditions  of  the  detainees,  more  problematic 
seems to be the lack of certainty about the treatment that would be faced by the 1153 people 
once returned to Libya, as the country is not a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Conven-
tion (FIDH, 2005:28). Italian officials claimed that “[Libya being a signatory of the] African  
Charter on Human and People's Rights and in its role as President of the Commission on Hu-
man Rights of the United Nations ensured the respect for human rights in the eyes of the Itali-
an  government  .”  (FIDH,  2005:28-29).  Despite  these  insurances,  Human  Rights  Watch 
believes  that  many  have  been  detained  at  their  arrival  (HRW,  2005  in  Andrijasevic, 
2009:154). The Italian government acted very carefully to avoid the use of the word “expul-
sion” and in identifying the migrants as economic migrants, in order not to incur in violation 
of the non-refoulement principle (FIDH, 2005:29).
A more recent but very similar case has been reported in 2009, when, from May 6th and in the 
following nine weeks, more than 900 boats of migrants coming from Libya have been inter-
cepted and forcibly returned, without any screening of who was on board and for what reas-
ons (HRW, 2009:23-24). Similarly to the previous case of 2004, major concerns have been 
raised regarding the treatment and the conditions of the migrants once returned to Libya, as 
many cases of abuse and arbitrary detention have been reported (HRW, 2009:15). Critiques 
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have also been raised following Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's declarations stating 
that the Italian coast guard operated in high seas, and that Italy is bound by the non-refoule-
ment  principle  only  regarding  migrants  that  have  already  reached  the  country  (HRW, 
2009:27), a point that has been severely attacked by NGO's such as Human Rights Watch 
(HRW, 2009).
These happenings – as others that have been reported (FIDH, 2007:27-29) – can be con-
sidered relevant to our study as they have attracted much attention on Italian migration and 
asylum policies and the legitimacy of the practices used, especially when considering Italy as 
one of the funding members of the European Union.
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8. Analysis
In this chapter we will apply the theories presented in chapter 4 to the case study, with the in-
tention to answer our research question.
8.1 Structure of the analysis
In order to analyse the area of migration and asylum in a functional and comprehensible man-
ner we have divided the subject into three main areas: (1) asylum, (2) the right to entry and 
stay, and (3) externalisation. Categorising the issue into these areas allows us to analyse them 
independently, but we are aware of the significant overlap which will be taken into account. 
Also, it is worth noting that we do not intend to categorise the different policies or aspects of 
such policies in a strict manner, but rather facilitate our analytical research and the reader.
The area of asylum is by definition highly interconnected with the Human Rights field and the 
1951 Refugee Convention and takes into consideration those policies that directly influence 
the  right  to  asylum,  the  treatment  of  asylum seekers  and  the  recognition  of  the  right  to 
asylum. Since they have a specific target, many of these policies are easy to identify, while 
others affect asylum seekers only indirectly, and might therefore have been positioned into 
one of the other areas we have delineated.
The right to entry and stay relates more broadly to the provisions and legislation that determ-
ine whether an migrant has the right to enter the EU (and the country) and which legal condi-
tions regulate his or her stay.
Externalisation enshrines the tendency to externalise the migration control to origin or transit 
countries. This includes, for instance, readmission agreements and the ‘Friendship Agreement’ 
between Italy and Libya. Hence, this policy area mostly relates to foreign policy.
In the first part of each section we establish the level of misfit between the EU and the Italian  
policy level, followed by an analysis of how the fit and misfit can be explained employing the 
mediating factors described in the theoretical chapter.  As mentioned, we are aware that this 
way of demarcating reality can be problematic as these policy areas overlap and are highly in-
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terconnected; i.e. when externalisation influence the right to seek asylum or when readmis-
sion agreements affects irregular migrants. Throughout the analysis, we will try to facilitate 
the understanding of crosscutting policies, but we will have the possibility to focus in depth 
on one aspect of migration and asylum policies at a time.
Furthermore, the analysis is structured in a chronological order, taking point of departure in 
the adoption of legislative acts in Italy which will then be compared to laws or guidelines 
provided by the EU. Due to the complex nature of these developments, a few issues will differ 
from this structure, in order to allow us to utilise its full analytical potential.
8.2 Right to entry and stay
Already in 1990,  before the creation of the third pillar  of  the EU, the  Martelli  law  (law 
39/1990) begun an initial transformation of Italian migration and asylum policies, by restrict-
ing conditions of entrance into the country, enhancing border control and turning expulsions 
from a tool to repress single individuals to a method of counteracting irregular immigration as 
a whole. Since at the time the EU did not have any competence on the issue, this development 
was initiated without any EU influence.
In 1998 while the EU was setting the aim of establishing a readmission and return policy to 
cope with irregular immigration, Italy had already adopted legislation for returning migrants 
who had illegally entered the country, including the institution of new powers and instruments 
(Turco-Napolitano law 40/1998), and was in the process of establishing several repatriation 
agreements. 
Accordingly, we can observe that from 1990 to 1998 Italy was ahead of the EU with regard to 
combating irregular immigration.
In 2002, right after the Bossi-Fini reform and tightly linked to it, the Berlusconi government 
regularised more than 700.000 migrants residing illegally in Italy, despite in 2001 the Com-
mission  had  issued  a  Communication  on  illegal  immigration  stating  that  regularisations 
should not be used as measures against irregular immigration (COM(2001)672:6). A Commu-
nication is not a legally binding document equal to a directive, but can nevertheless be under-
stood  as  a  statement  of  the  Commission  about  which  direction  they  want  to  follow  in 
developing policy.  Accordingly, Italy was clearly not in accordance with the EU direction 
concerning regularisations. However, Italy was not obliged to comply, as there was no direct-
ive forbidding mass-regularisations. Despite the fact that the Commission Communication is 
not a legally binding document for the member states, there is a misfit between Italy's action 
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and the Commission's statement regarding regularisation of illegal migrants, which should be 
considered as inertia, since Italy followed a procedure that was not uncommon (there had 
been many other regularisations in the past) and did not consider the EU's position. Since 
Italy moved exactly in the opposite direction of what the Commission was suggesting, one 
may consider this case as retrenchment. However this opposition appears to be a coincidence 
rather than a concrete reaction opposed to the EU position. Thus we consider it as inertia.
Almost  at  the same time,  the Bossi-Fini  law strengthened the role  of the CPTAs (FIDH, 
2005:9) and made expulsion the norm for dealing with irregular migrantsColombo-Sciortino, 
2003:207), thereby bringing this aspect of the policy into accordance with the EU policy ap-
proach.
Considering the development from the Martelli law, over the Turco-Napolitano law to the 
Bossi-Fini law, the approach to irregular immigration was gradually transformed from a regu-
larisation approach to an expulsion one. Although EU action in this area was just beginning, 
Italy did in fact go in the same direction of the EU. However, since the EU did not provide 
concrete directives on expulsion and return for the time being, there was no direct EU pres-
sure behind the changes in Italian policy. This also means that Italy was free to set its own 
standards and procedures.
In 2005 Italy adopted a new legislation to transpose Council Directive 2001/40/EC on mutual 
recognition of expulsion decisions into national law. The deadline for transposition in the 
member states was December 2002. Italy adopted the directive in national law only in the 
year 2005, with three-year delay, but did so through a new legislation in accordance with the 
EU directive. Thus, an accommodation of EU law took place after a period of inertia. 
In 2007, after more than a year of delay, Italy transposed the Council Directive on family re-
unification (2003/86/EC) into national law, by amending the law decree 286/1998 with the le-
gislative  decree  5/2007,  which  was  later  modified  again  in  2008.  The  right  to  family 
reunification applies for third-country nationals residing lawfully in the territory, but does not 
include asylum seekers awaiting for their application to be processed and third country na-
tionals under temporary protection. (2003/86/EC: art.3(2))  Before the transposition of the dir-
ective Italian law restricted family reunification to the  spouse and minor dependent children 
(Bia, 2004:14). However the new legislative decree provides that a third-country national can 
apply for family reunification “of spouses, unmarried minor children, also of other spouse, or  
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of children born out of wedlock, provided that the other parent, if still alive, has given his  
consent; of adult dependent children if unable to care for their essential life needs because of  
bad health conditions; of dependent parents if they do not have an adequate family support in  
the country of origin or provenance” (legislative decree 286/1998:art.29 in Boca, 2009:24). 
Accordingly, the directive was absorbed through extension of the scope of the existing law in-
cluding all mandatory and some optional provisions on family reunification after a longer 
delay which we could consider as a period of inertia before the final absorption.
In 2008 Italy adopted two more Council Directives (2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC) on the 
conditions of admission of third-country nationals for study or scientific research purposes, 
after a short delay. Both directives were adopted through modification of three already exist-
ing articles in the law 286/1998. Thus, this adoption of EU Directives can be considered as 
absorption of EU law. 
Between the years 2005 and 2008 Italy constantly adopted the Directives regarding the right 
to entry and stay produced at EU level, which can be interpreted as a general commitment to 
the transposition of hard law from the EU. Furthermore, it demonstrates a direct influence of 
the EU on Italy. However, in the following, will be shown a more complex picture of the mis-
fits between EU and Italian laws on decisive issues like expulsion.
In 2008 the EU adopted a directive (2008/115/EC) on common standards and procedures in 
member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The deadline for trans-
position in the member states expires in December 2010. Italy did not provide any notification 
on national legislation concerning this directive, which allows us to assume that the directive 
hasn't yet been adopted. Since the time set for the member states to adopt this directive, as set  
by the EU, has not yet run out, the current lack of adoption in Italy should not be considered 
as inertia, since Italy could still comply within the appropriate time frame.
Nonetheless, Italy already defined rules on the expulsion and return of irregular migrants 
through the Bossi-Fini law of 2002. On this basis, we can consider the level of misfit between 
the current Italian law and the new EU directive on return of irregular migrants. First of all 
the right to decide whether or not to expel an irregular migrant stays with the member states. 
But if such a decision is made, the procedure defined by the EU shall be applied. This in-
cludes a two-step approach, that allows voluntary return before forced expulsion, as outlined 
in the chapter 6.3. The Italian law and practices do not respect this two-step approach. In 
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practice, since the CPTAs don't always have limited detention capabilities and since the de-
portation could be considered too costly or problematic due to the doubtful origin of the mi-
grant, often an irregular migrant can receive an expulsion notification with the order to leave 
the country within five days on his/her own expenses (Pastore, 2008:110). Accordingly, the 
Italian procedures are not in conformity with the new EU Directive. The Italian standards re-
garding the number of days until a migrant has to leave the country are lower than the minim-
um standards determined by the EU, and thus have to be amended. Furthermore, a distinction 
needs to be made between voluntary and forced return of migrants.
On the other hand, the EU directive sets the maximum period of detention to six months, 
which can be expanded for a further twelve months, while Italian law determines that mi-
grants can be detained for up to sixty days. Thus Italy could even extend the period of deten-
tion and still be in accordance with EU law.
However, Italy goes a step further than the EU by criminalising irregular immigration. As out-
lined in section 7.3, in the case of an expulsion notification (when not accompanied directly to 
the border),  the position of the irregular migrant could also become a criminal offence if 
he/she is unable to leave the country within the required time period. Thus, the Italian law is 
considerably stricter than the EU directive which provides no reference to criminalising the 
act of irregular immigration.
Both in the EU directive and in Italian law, the migrant is granted the right to appeal. How-
ever, in practice this right is not granted, as outlined in section 7.3.
This comparison demonstrates that Italy has to make several amendments in its laws on ex-
pulsion in order to be in conformity with EU law. Indeed also the capabilities of the CPTAs 
need to be enhanced in order to allow the practice to follow the law. As Italy would have to 
adopt  considerable  changes  in  its  current  legislation  on  expulsion,  but  wouldn't  have  to 
change the fundamental direction of the policy on irregular migration, the required adaptation 
would be characterised as accommodation. 
The EU return directive also creates a possible loophole for the member states by stating that 
a longer period of review and worse conditions of detention may be allowed when a very 
large number of third-country nationals affects the administrative or judicial capacities of a 
member state. (2008/115/EC:art.18(1)) This in fact gives Italy the possibility to justify worse 
conditions.
The directive on the return of irregular migrants additionally emphasises the application of the 
non-refoulement principle meaning that no migrant should be sent back to persecution. Al-
though Italian law refers to this principle, its application is questionable. The examples of 
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2004 and 2009 when large numbers of migrants trying to enter Italy were denied access and 
readmitted by Libya,  justifies such concerns.  These cases will  be further discussed in the 
chapter on externalisation.
Having pointed out that the Return Directive (2008/115/EC) does not consider irregular entry 
and stay as a crime, it is worth mentioning that in 2009 Italy amended the Turco-Napolitano 
law  through law 94/2009 and thereby introduced the crime of “illegal entry and stay in the  
territory of the State” (Boca, 2009:21-22). A third-country national who enters the country il-
legally or overstays in Italy would be punished with a fine of € 5.000 to 10.000, with the in-
clusion of those seeking international protection, for whom, however, the effect of the law is 
suspended until the decision on the application for asylum, and annulled, if the asylum seeker 
is granted refugee status (Boca, 2009:2-22). This example shows Italy's commitment to the 
fight against irregular immigration, that doesn't  necessarily result from EU pressure.
8.2.1 Decreto Flussi
In this section the Decreto flussi will be discussed. It is taken at the end of the chapter on the 
right of entry and stay because its role over time requires an individual analysis.
With regard to regular immigration the reform in 1998 producing the Turco-Napolitano law 
(law 40/1998) introduced the Decreto flussi, a tool that, more realistically than in the past, sets 
via law decree the acceptable legal flow of migrants for the year to come, together with their 
country of origin. However, the entry quotas established by the Italian governments remained 
far below real demands and the inefficiency of the corresponding bureaucratic processes still 
caused major difficulties for the recruitment of foreign workers. (Einaudi, 2007 in Finotelli & 
Sciortino, 2008:5) Thus, none of the mechanisms for the actual application of this decree were 
fully implemented, which made the Decreto flussi not exercisable.
With the 2004 Hague Programme the European Council emphasised that the volume of eco-
nomic migrants accepted every year is to be determined by each member state, thus leaving 
the competence over the Decreto flussi to Italy. Though, the EU called already in the Tampere 
Programme of 1999 for a more efficient management of migration flows, both legal and illeg-
al.  (Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 1999:IV)  Furthermore, the Hague 
Programme states that  “legal migration will play an important role in enhancing the know-
ledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic development, and thus contributing  
to  the  implementation  of  the  Lisbon  strategy” (The  Hague  Programme,  2004:10).  Con-
sequently, the establishment of adequate mechanisms to efficiently manage legal migration, is 
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necessary in order to aspire to the EU goals, to the extent that legal migration is considered as  
a relevant part for their achievement. However, also “the Berlusconi government has no offi-
cial plans on this matter, thus disregarding one of the main stumbling blocks of Italian immig-
ration policy.”(Finotelli & Sciortino, 2008:5)
Furthermore, an interesting change in the  Decreto flussi was undertaken in 2006, when the 
government increased the number of economic migrants that would be legally admitted to 
Italy in  order  to  include all  applications  by employers  in  Italy.  Above that,  Finotelli  and 
Sciortino point out that “the decision was based on the assumption that the applications had  
actually  been  filed  for  workers  already  irregularly  living  in  the  country” (Finotelli  & 
Sciortino, 2008:6). Accordingly, the Italian government had used the instrument, which ini-
tially serves to admit economic migrants legally to the country, to indirectly regularise the po-
sition of irregular migrants already residing and working in Italy. This practice is conflicting 
with the EU position regarding regularisation on one hand, and on the other hand also con-
flicts with the importance the EU attaches to efficient management of legal migration as Italy 
misused the Decreto flussi and thereby undermined the legal recruitment of economic workers 
from abroad.
In 2008 the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum suggested that migrants staying illeg-
ally in a member state should only be allowed to stay and work on the basis of their individual 
circumstances (Bertozzi, 2008:2). The Pact states that foreign persons being in the countries 
illegally must  leave territories (The European Pact  on Immigration and Asylum, 2008:6). 
Thus, the Pact emphasises once more the EU position against mass-regularisations. 
In this light, there is a clear misfit between the importance the EU attaches to effective man-
agement of legal migration and the effort made by Italy in this direction which could possibly 
even be counterproductive considering the misuse of the Decreto flussi and the actual goals of 
the EU. Since Italy does not take any steps towards improving this situation, we can define 
this case as inertia.
Eventually, we can observe that Italy was in certain ways ahead of the EU regarding the fight 
against  irregular  immigration.  By introducing  the  Return  Directive  in  2008,  EU policies 
moved forward and thereby created misfits which Italy needs to solve in the future.
Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that EU directives, constituting hard law, are in general 
adopted by Italy through accommodation or absorption, whereas major misfits and cases of 
inertia appear in the areas of soft law. The cases of regularisation in 2002 and 2006, and the 
lack of management of legal migration for economic reasons, establish the main misfits with 
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soft law from the EU in the area of the right to entry and stay, which are further characterised 
by inertia. Indeed, with the exception of the Return Directive, crucial issues of immigration 
policy are rather addressed by EU soft law than hard law. Above that, the fact that in 2009 
Italy introduced illegal entry and stay as a crime in its legal system, can be considered as very 
critical since it  goes beyond any EU action in this area.  Furthermore,  it  could potentially 
cause problems in the future as it is considerably stricter than any EU law on irregular immig-
ration.
These major misfits – i.e. the regularisation approach, the criminalisation of irregular immig-
ration and the role of the Decreto Flussi – deserve further attention and analysis. In order to 
provide a better understanding of the processes pertaining to this specific area of the migra-
tion and asylum policies, we will now analyse which factors have influenced the outcome of 
Italian legislation, enhancing or reducing the misfit with EU policies.
8.2.2 Irregular immigration as a criminal offence and the 2002 regularisa-
tion
A very relevant misfit previously highlighted is linked to the development of the Bossi-Fini 
(189/2002) law and its tight connection to the mass regularisation that legalised the position 
of more than 700.000 migrants (through law 195/2002). As explained above, both elements 
(the regularisation and the criminal offence), represent a consistent misfit between the policies 
of the two levels.
The level of misfit presented above and classified as inertia, is given due to the interaction of 
several factors involved in the processes that led to the making of such laws. Namely, we can 
easily trace the role of the government and of different political parties, of big and small in-
dustry, of the Catholic Church and the norms it provides, of the ground norms of democracy.
Colombo and Sciortino (2003:201-202) highlight the different positions regarding migration 
issues of Italian political parties during the electoral campaign of 2001. It is very interesting 
to look at the differences between the parties that form the centre-right coalition “La Casa 
delle Libertà” (CDL), led by Silvio Berlusconi, that will win the election and create a new 
government on June 10th, 2001. The different parties within the coalition have very different 
agendas on the matter, ranging from the desire of allowing entrance and stay only to a very 
limited amount of effectively working migrants (Lega Nord and parts of Forza Italia), to the 
desire  of  fighting  clandestine  immigration  but  allowing  the  stay  to  workers  (Alleanza 
Nazionale and parts of Forza Italia), or the feeling of solidarity for migrant workers on the ter-
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ritory (CCD-CDU). It is from these very different agendas that the Berlusconi government 
will initiate the reform process, trying to maintain unity on an issue in which there seems to 
be very little to unite under (Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:201-202).
A two-track process is therefore started, which contains the Bossi-Fini law and its highly re-
pressive mechanisms, together with the regularisation process. It is interesting to note how 
both extremes of the coalition (in the specific, Lega Nord on one side and CCD-CDU on the 
other) are willing to allow the other extreme to pursue its interest, as long as their particular 
interest is not questioned. Equally, these agendas are perceived by the actors as important 
enough for their policy making to not worry about EU guidelines on the matter, thus reducing 
the entire debate to a domestic level. Despite much talk both inside and outside the parlia-
ment, the most repressive sides of the Bossi-Fini law will not be amended, leading among 
other things to the legal criminalisation of the irregular stay, while the regularisation that was 
much despised by some members of the government, will slowly transform into a mass regu-
larisation that will legalise 700.000 migrants (Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:209-210).
In the few months of hearings, talks and changes, an interesting strategy is used by the mem-
bers of the government: aware of the opposition of their electors to a mass regularisation, 
every step of this process is accompanied by a visible media statement that focuses on the im-
plementation (or the possibility of implementation) of new repressive tools, such as the use of 
the navy to patrol the sea borders or the registration of foreigners' fingerprints as a require-
ment for entry into the country. Such a strategy allows the government both to deviate the at-
tention of parties such as Lega Nord from the proceedings of the regularisation by focusing on 
the new repressive tools, as well as the attention of the general public (Colombo & Sciortino, 
2003:208-209).
Colombo and Sciortino also point out, while defining the criteria for the new regularisation, 
how many factors influence the target of such a law. If the original ideological reason for a 
regularisation is to be found in the Catholic feelings of the more moderate parties of the gov-
erning coalition (CCD-CDU) and can be interpreted as a legacy of the strongly rooted Cathol-
ic  activism  related  to  migrants,  the  expansion  of  the  scope  of  the  regularisation  has  to 
consider also other informal mediating factors. Small and big industry associations saw the 
coming regularisation as an opportunity to legalise the position of many of their subordinate 
workers. Also, the tension towards an expansion was fostered by the basic norms of demo-
cracy, that would give the government a hard time in justifying the regularisation of home-
helpers and care takers (the initial scope of the law), while leaving in the irregularity other 
workers (Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:210). The mixed effect of these factors, led to a mass 
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regularisation, that was precisely what the EU has made explicit was not wanted only one 
year earlier, through the Communication 672 of 2001 (COM(2001)672). 
This example proves to be interesting in defining the roles of different mediating factors, both 
of the formal and of the informal kind.  It  is also worth mentioning because the contrasts 
between different factors produced two policies that are both not in line with the general EU 
guidelines about how migrants should be treated and about which channels should be used to 
allow immigration towards the EU. Although none of the two laws is in clear conflict with 
hard law mechanisms, they do not follow the EU policy direction, and they do so by counter-
balancing each other at the national level: it is this domestic conflict that allows both sides of 
the governing majority to pursue their policy. In this situation the mediating factors involved 
bargain among themselves and obtain two different results that are not at all in line with the 
EU guidelines. The national agendas of the different factors are considered more important 
than compliance with EU norms, which leads to ignoring the EU position on regularisation 
and on treatment of irregular migrants. In this, “the deep cultural differences in the concep-
tion  of  the  rule  of  law”,  should  certainly be  considered  as  an  important  factor  (Pastore, 
2008:116). We can also explain this example through the theory of Rational Choice Institu-
tionalism, as national actors engage in bargaining that has as focal point in their interest, and 
are willing to ignore EU policies on the issue, since they perceive as more important their par-
ticular domestic goal.
8.2.3 The failure of the “Decreto flussi”
While the EU has actively encouraged member states to adopt tools to actively regulate mi-
gration flows and admission procedures, and on the other hand has discouraged states to leg-
alise a migrant's irregular position through ad-hoc regularisations, Italy has failed to comply 
with these guidelines. If the example of the 2002 regularisation has been presented above, it is 
important to highlight the failure of the Decreto flussi in determining an active policy of im-
migration.
Instituted by the Turco-Napolitano law in 1998, the Decreto flussi was never entirely imple-
mented,  and  many different  factors  through  the  years  have  contributed  to  its  failure.  As 
Colombo and Sciortino point out, it was the same government of centre-left that, in the first 
years of the implementation of such a mechanisms, didn't invest in it as much as it would 
have been needed. This, followed by the politicisation of the migration issue during the elect-
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oral campaign of 2001 and the constant attacks coming from the centre-right coalition, de-
termined the initial failure of such a policy (Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:203).
Following the Bossi-Fini reform of 2002, this tool has changed and has become a more rigid 
structure, that hardly allows the supply and demand of workforce to match, instigating further 
irregular immigration, due to the difficulties of such a legal process (Pastore, 2008:116).
The intervention in this area is again characterised by a prevalence of the domestic interests 
over the EU guidelines: the influence of parties such as the Lega Nord on Berlusconi's gov-
ernment resulted to be stronger than the influence that the EU visions played. At the same 
time,  the generally negative perception of migrants  present  in  Italian society (see section 
5.1.2) allowed for a more restrictive reform of this tool, that could be presented to the public 
as effective in limiting the access only to the migrants that were strongly needed by the do-
mestic economy and for whom the employers were willing to take responsibility themselves 
(as mentioned in section 7.2).
This example is interesting to highlight an underlying conflict of opposing interests existing 
in some of the key mediating factors, that heavily affects how different EU policies are adop-
ted and implemented at the Italian level. The “hidden regularisation” of 2006, exposes the 
conflicting interests between factors such as certain political parties and certain norms of Itali-
an society (and their success in restricting the effectiveness of the active policy for immigra-
tion)  on  one  side,  and  the  practical  needs  of  Italian  economy,  represented  by  the  need 
expressed by employers and industry associations for foreign labour, and other norms (such as 
catholic solidarity) on the other. The interests of these factors are mediated into a policy out-
come that is consistent through the years only if considering (hidden or out in the open) regu-
larisations as a normal tool, a “back door” that is left open while the “front door” is being 
closed with restrictive active policies (Colombo & Sciortino, 2003:212). The result is a policy 
that does not reflect any of the EU guidelines on the issue, but is instead lacking on the active  
recruitment of migrants while allowing “illegal entry or residence [to become] the desired  
stable form of residence” (COM(2001)672:6).
The outcomes of this policy process can be explained through the lenses of Historical Institu-
tionalism, as the  Decreto Flussi has not changed from its marginal role in Italian migration 
policies, also after the EU positions on active immigration policies have become clearer. In-
stead, it was used in 2006 to allow the continuation of another 'traditional' practice (that of 
regularisations) the EU was opposed to. Equally, the legacy of decades of informal economy 
that led to such a situation,  is,  as highlighted above, a tolerated condition,  and struggling 
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against it would bring to the surface unresolved tensions between State and Italian society (Fi-
notelli & Sciortino, 2008:6).
8.3 Asylum
In 2002 the Bossi-Fini law lowered the level of protection for asylum seekers by establishing 
a simplified asylum procedure, which also determined that asylum seekers could be detained 
for up to sixty days, while awaiting their asylum application to be processed together with ir-
regular migrants awaiting their expulsion (Pascale & Favilli, 2007:38).  Italy made no direct 
distinction between asylum seekers and irregular migrants, but it used the same approach and 
treatment for both, treating asylum seekers as irregular migrants until they are granted refugee 
status. In 1999, the European Council in Vienna clearly pointed out that there should be a sep-
aration between the areas of immigration and asylum including separate approaches for deal-
ing with migrants and asylum seekers. However, Italy did not take the European Council's 
position into account during the reform in 2002, and issues regarding asylum have been in-
cluded in legislation on immigration, due to the absence of an organic law on asylum (Boca, 
2009:7). Accordingly, we can observe that there is a lack of attention attributed to asylum 
seekers  and  their  rights  in  Italian  law,  that  results  in  ambiguous  practices.  Although  the 
European Council's statement should be considered as soft law that aims at shaping the devel-
opment of immigration and asylum policy at EU level, it should still be taken into considera-
tion by the member states when reforming national immigration policy. Italy was not forced 
to take the European Council's position into account, as it is soft law and not hard law, but we 
can still consider this development as inertia, since Italy ignored the EU development of this 
policy area during the reform of Italian immigration and asylum policy. 
In January 2003 Italy missed the deadline for the adoption of Council Directive (2001/55/EC) 
on temporary protection, that was adopted only a few months after. In general all minimum 
standards for giving temporary protection set out by the directive were considered and adop-
ted in Italian law, which refers back to the reform of 1998, as the reform already considered 
temporary protection. Since the provisions of this law will only take effect when a situation of 
a mass-influx was officially declared, they will not have any direct effect on Italy's general 
practices regarding  the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers, and thus do not establish a 
significant challenge for Italian policy and practices in general. Since only minor adjustments 
were adopted, this case can be classified as absorption.
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In October 2005, about eight months after the deadline, Italy notified the Commission of the 
transposition into national law of directive 2003/9/EC on the reception conditions for asylum 
seekers.  Due to several discrepancies regarding this directive, it is an interesting case to in-
vestigate further.  Following the adoption of the directive 2003/9/EC, the Odysseus network 
prepared a report for the European Commission on the implementation of this directive in 
Italy. The report reveals  that the new legislation following the EU directive constitutes the 
first  direct  law  on  reception  conditions  for  asylum  seekers  in  Italy  (Pascale  &  Favilli, 
2007:37). Moreover, the impact of the directive is evaluated as follows: 
“The transposition of the directive has not lowered the level of protection existing before also because,  
there was not before a legislative system and a clear definition of standard. However it is important to  
stress that the level was already lowered by the reform of the asylum procedure, in particular the provision  
of a simplified procedure with the detention of asylum seekers in Centre of Identifications or Centre of tem-
porary stay, where asylum seekers can stay with aliens awaiting for deportation. The mix between the new  
rules on asylum procedure and reception conditions bring to see in complex the level of protection lowered.  
The reason is not the reception of Directive 2003/9/CE but, considering the relevant changes of rules on  
procedures, the impact of the Directive’s transposition is minimum” (Pascale & Favilli, 2007:38).
More precisely, Italy complies with the scope of the directive, as well as with the provision al-
lowing asylum seekers free movement within the territory and the provisions on health care. 
The asylum seekers' access to the labour market now is enhanced, since asylum seekers are 
refused access for the first six months of their stay, while before they were not granted any ac-
cess to the labour market for the entire procedure. However, Italian law can be interpreted in a 
way that would result in provisions on reception ending when the asylum seeker is allowed to  
work (Pascale & Favilli, 2007:11), which would not be in conformity with the EU directive. 
Furthermore, the housing of asylum seekers creates problems, since the number of places in 
accommodation centres is considerably lower than the number of asylum seekers coming per 
year,  and  the  financial  support  is  considered  as  largely  insufficient (Pascale  &  Favilli, 
2007:20), This is a major obstacle for the provisions to be applied in practice, as the EU dir-
ective  determines that  member states are obliged to provide the applicant with appropriate 
material reception conditions1, and to ensure a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of the applicant and his family (2003/9/EC:art.13). Since both accommodation and 
1 “‘material reception conditions’ shall mean the reception conditions that include housing, food and clothing, provided 
in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, and a daily expenses allowance” (Council Directive 2003/9/EC Art. 2 
Definitions: (j))
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financial support for asylum seekers seem to be insufficient for the amount of applicants, Italy 
can hardly live up to the provision of the EU directive. Even though the conditions of the ac-
commodations are adequate and in conformity with the EU directive, it does not guarantee the 
appropriate standard of living for all asylum seekers.
The directive also determines that a decision to withdraw the reception conditions have to be 
taken  objectively,  impartially  and  individually  (2003/9/EC:art.16(4)).  However,  the  report 
questions the impartiality of decisions because of highly automatised procedures and because 
the administrative authority responsible  for  taking the decision is  not  obliged to hear  the 
asylum seeker (Pascale & Favilli, 2007:17). When decisions on withdrawal of reception con-
ditions are made on a rather automatic basis without a real consideration of the personal situ-
ation of the asylum seeker, we can state that there is a lack of concern about the rights of 
asylum seekers within the Italian asylum system, whereas EU legislation clearly puts the con-
cern for the asylum seeker's rights to the fore. Thus, we can perceive a misfit between EU law 
and the way Italy adopted it. 
Another relevant issue is that asylum seekers can be detained in Italy during the asylum pro-
cedure and until the final decision, as mentioned before, due to the absence of a document of 
identity, but also for non-possession of the documents required to enter the territory.(Pascale 
& Favilli, 2007:28-29) Moreover, Italy does not apply the directive on reception conditions 
to the places where asylum seekers are detained, but it is referred to another legislative decree 
(2004/303) that provides for adequate information, legal advice and health care for detained 
asylum seekers. (Pascale & Favilli, 2007:31)
Although the EU directive establishes room for manoeuvre for the member states regarding 
detention by stating that “when it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons  
of public order, Member States may confine an applicant to a particular place in accordance  
with their national law” (2003/9/EC:art.7(3)), the detention of asylum seekers due to illegal 
entry  has  important  consequences  for  the  impact  of  this  directive  in  Italy,  since  asylum 
seekers are often forced to enter a member state illegally, and the provisions set by the direct-
ive do not apply to detention centres. The report points this out by saying that a 
“[...] weakness of the system of reception conditions is that with the effect of the new asylum procedures  
only a large minority of asylum seekers will  be able to benefit  of them because almost all  the asylum  
seekers will be detained either in a Centre of Identification or in a Centre of Temporary Stay.”(Pascale & 
Favilli, 2007:38).
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It was additionally mentioned that, between April 2005 and April 2006, approximately 62 per-
cent of all asylum seekers who applied for asylum were detained in Centres of Identification 
or CPTAs (Pascale & Favilli, 2007:32). It is evident that detention of asylum seekers seems to 
be rather the rule than the exception in Italy.
Additionally, it has been noted how the fact that the Geneva Convention doesn't recognise the 
principle of illegality while entering a country as a clandestine makes Italian practices a viola-
tion of the Convention both when asylum seekers are detained in CPTA's and in the Ita-
ly-Libya case (FIDH, 2005:31).
Eventually, we can see that despite the transposition of the directive into national law and the 
compliance with several reception conditions, there are several conflicts between Italian and 
EU law in this respect. Major issues are the lack of sufficient capabilities to provide the recep-
tion conditions laid down in the directive, the questionable impartiality of decisions with-
drawing reception conditions, and the detention of asylum seekers for illegal entry combined 
with the fact that the directive is not applied to detention centres. These factors are indeed de-
cisive for the effectiveness of the transposition, which shows us that especially issues whose 
adoption would pose a challenge for policy-makers are left unsettled.
Furthermore, the transposition of the EU directive cannot outweigh the reduction of protec-
tion through the 2002 reform, that created the simplified asylum procedure and implied the 
detention of asylum seekers together with irregular migrants. Thus the statement that its im-
pact is significantly diminished through the previous reform is justified. Nonetheless, the as-
sessment that it created more clarity and coherence of the provisions on reception conditions 
(Pascale & Favilli, 2007:37) is a positive effect on Italian asylum policies since the lack of an 
organic asylum law was identified as a major problem. 
The in-depth analysis of this case allows us to identify the adoption of the directive as an in-
sufficient accommodation, since we can still observe a misfit after the transposition of the dir-
ective. 
In 2008 Italy notified the transposition of  the Council Directive 'on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third-country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted' 
(2004/83/EC) and of  Council Directive 'on minimum standards on procedures in member 
states for granting and withdrawing refugee status' (2005/85/EC). Italy delayed the adoption 
of both directives, but eventually adopted them through the introduction of new legislation, 
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thus bringing its standards on qualification and procedures concerning refugees in conformity 
with EU minimum standards.
Worth mentioning is the enhancement of the right to appeal. Until 2008 asylum seekers still  
had to leave the territory, since the dismissal was given together with an expulsion order, un-
less the asylum seeker asked the Prefetto  (the administrative authority) for authorisation  to 
stay in the country during the jurisdictional recourse (Pascale & Favilli, 2007:11). Such prac-
tices were indeed critical as they could possibly undermine the asylum seekers right to appeal, 
even though this right was recognised by Italian law. However, with the transposition of Dir-
ective 2005/85/EC the appeal is  accompanied by a suspensive effect allowing the asylum 
seeker to stay in the territory until the court decision, and the previous procedure is abolished 
(Boca, 2009:20). If the asylum seeker is detained in an identification centre or a CPTA  “after 
absconding or attempting to evade border controls or for having submitted the application 
after being arrested in irregular stay conditions” the suspensive effect of the appeal is not 
automatic, but the court decides on the suspension within five days after the filing of the ap-
peal (Boca, 2009:17-18). Accordingly, the EU Directive clearly improved the recognition of 
the asylum seeker's right to appeal through an automatic suspensive effect, and in the case of 
a detained asylum seeker, through the involvement of the court in the decision instead of the 
administrative authority.
Additionally the European Migration Network's 2009 report points out that the Italian legis-
lative decrees 251/2007 and 25/2008, which were the responses to EU Directive 2004/83/EC 
and 2005/85/EC, have considerably contributed to the development of a more organic asylum 
framework (Boca, 2009:5). Since the transposition of both EU directives seems to have had a 
significantly positive effect in Italy and resulted in a change of practices regarding the appeal 
procedures, the adoption of the directives can be considered as an accommodation.
Finally, in EU law as well as in general EU guidelines asylum appears to be one of the main 
issues and the right to seek asylum is continuously addressed.  But in Italy asylum seems to 
have only a subordinate role in both law and practices, due to the absence of a single text on 
asylum and the inclusion of asylum issues in immigration law, due to the examples given 
throughout the text and furthermore due to Italy's controversial refoulement practices which 
will be highlighted in section 8.4.
In the 2002 reform we could observe inertia  in Italy vis-á-vis the EU soft  law regarding 
asylum. However, the following years show a constant adaptation of EU hard law in Italy. 
Nevertheless, misfits could still be observed, as in the insufficient accommodation of minim-
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um standards on reception conditions. However, in the last years the importance of asylum 
seems to slowly gain recognition in Italy as the accommodation of the directives 2004/83/EC 
and  2005/85/EC  demonstrates. Overall,  there is a positive development of asylum law in 
Italy, which has clearly been influenced by the adoption of hard law at EU-level. Furthermore, 
this development is mainly characterised through accommodation of EU directives, but also 
through the initial lack of concern for asylum seekers, and thus will require further develop-
ment in the years to come.
However, despite the positive trend of the recent years, the treatment of asylum seekers seems 
to be below the standards indicated by the EU, and many practices do not seem to differenti-
ate asylum seekers from other migrants. In the following section we will try and investigate 
more in depth the causes and the mediating factors that have affected the development of such 
policies through the years.
8.3.1 Treatment of asylum seekers
As presented above, several Italian practices and policies do not comply with EU policies on 
the corresponding issues.
This is not limited to the refoulement of potential asylum seekers, that could be labelled as an 
extraordinary event, but also comprehends the everyday mechanisms present (or lacking) in 
the Italian context that deprive asylum seekers of their right to seek asylum, or of the condi-
tions that the European Union considers as minimum standards for their subsistence. The de-
tention of asylum seekers together with other migrants in CPTAs, the impossibility of lodging 
an asylum application in certain situations (such as the Libyan case that will be presented in 
8.4.1) and the long times needed in order to receive an answer to such application while not 
allowed to work for the first six months, and even the simple delay in the application of the  
directive 2004/83 on the qualification of refugee status for foreign nationals, are all to be con-
sidered as a treatment of asylum seekers that does not conform with EU standards, and that 
does not seem to draw a clear difference between the treatment of asylum seekers and that of 
“traditional” migrants.
In this case, while looking at the mechanisms that the EU used to pursue its agenda about 
asylum seekers, it is difficult to locate 'where and when something didn't go as it should have'. 
It is equally difficult to attribute the responsibility for such differences within the two policy 
levels to one or another specific actor in the domestic level, or to one clearly emerging medi-
ating factor.
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The explanation could be twofold, and could be most easily explained through the lenses of 
Sociological Institutionalist theory, as the norms present in Italian society can be considered 
as a major element (and veto-points) of the policy shaping in this area. On the one hand, the 
perception of irregular migrants as linked to criminality (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2008:2) can be 
playing its role. Although according to the Geneva Convention asylum seekers should not be 
penalised for entering the country illegally, their clandestine entry tends to categorise them as 
irregular as much as any other migrant to the eyes of the Italian public. After having lodged 
an asylum application, the majority do not receive lodging and none is not allowed to work 
legally for the first six months of stay in the country, being therefore forced to a condition of 
illegality as workers of the Italian informal economy. The idea that everyone who is irregular 
is a danger for public order and Italian society can be easily perceived by studies of Italian 
media and by analysing the governing and electoral programmes of the two main political co-
alitions in the last three elections (see section 5.6), and could be one of the reasons that lead to 
a treatment of asylum seekers below EU standards.
On the other hand, looking at Italian social and political norms, it seems to emerge that a spe-
cial treatment for asylum seekers has never been part of the core national concepts underlying 
migration issues. Despite the concept of asylum seeker being present in the Italian Constitu-
tion (Art.10.3) and the ratification of the Geneva Convention in 1954, Italy lifted the geo-
graphical limitation to the Geneva Convention that limited the granting of the refugee status 
exclusively to persons of European origin only in 1990 with the Martelli law (FIDH, 2005:8). 
All last three reforms of Italian migration and asylum policies (1990, 1998, 2002) address 
some of the issues pertaining asylum seekers, but have failed in showing a preference towards 
the protection of asylum seekers' rights (FIDH, 2005:8). Therefore, the different dilemmas 
presented at the beginning of this paragraph could be explained by assuming that Italian soci-
ety and policy makers lack a norm that motivates a clear distinction between asylum seekers 
and other migrants. 
The experience of Boca on the issue can be very helpful in understanding this point:
“[...] the Italian public has a scarce knowledge of the asylum subject. Many, in fact, still don’t realize that  
not only irregular migrants reach Italy by sea or other means, but also many migrants pushed by the need 
to save their lives or to escape from conflicts or persecution,  and that they should properly be called  
asylum or humanitarian protection applicants.” (Boca, 2009:5-6).
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The interpretation of the (lack of this) norm as a mediating factor, can help understanding the 
level of misfit present between Italian and EU policies. Since the difference between asylum 
seekers and other migrants is not perceived as relevant, Italian policy makers do little in order 
to comply with EU directives and regulations on the issue. At most, they tend to absorb dir-
ectives without creating the institutions and mechanisms that would be required to ensure 
their full application and, as shown by the Libyan case, at times they allow domestic interests 
to  outweigh  the  interest  of  protecting  asylum seekers  rights  and  of  complying  with  EU 
policies.
A fruitful mediation pertaining to this policy area can be given by presenting the example of 
the 'Tavolo Asilo' (Asylum table). Following directives  2004/83/EC and  2005/85/EC, a vast 
array of national and foreign associations and institutions put pressure on the Italian govern-
ment in order to  “lay the foundations for a future comprehensive reform” (Boca, 2009:31). 
The work of the members of the Tavolo Asilo,  “overcoming the obvious and natural differ-
ences between them, have proved capable of putting together their skills, knowledge and ex-
perience, and have worked together constructively” (Boca, 2009:31) producing a change in 
the Italian legislative framework to reflect the EU (and international) position on the matter 
and absorb (after a period of inertia) EU directive 2004/83/EC. The Tavolo Asilo also started 
a campaign with the objective of changing the understanding of asylum seekers in Italian so-
ciety, therefore attempting to modify those norms that, without the required changes, hinder a 
deeper implementation of EU directives on the treatment of asylum seekers (Boca, 2009:32). 
This campaign, if successful, could produce that transformation in the politics and polity area 
needed to trigger a more radical transformation in the policy, which may result in an asylum 
policy more in line with EU and international standards.
8.4 Externalisation and external border control 
The Council conclusions from 2002 pointed out that irregular immigration flows require a 
political response that includes measures pertaining boarding, departure or transit countries as 
well as joint control of migration flows. In fact, Italy is using a similar approach through co-
operation with Libya, but does not consider the actual human rights situation in the country, 
despite several international organisations like Human Rights Watch have pointed out that 
Libya does not live up to International Human Rights standards and is not a signatory of the 
1951 Geneva Convention (HRW, 2009:11).
68
The Return Directive carries within itself an exception to the obligation to follow its own pro-
cedures for those migrants that are intercepted while attempting to enter the country without 
authorisation. (2008/115/EC: art.2(2a)) This does, however, not imply that the member states 
can adopt and enforce legislation at their own discretion, since they are still bound by Article 
13 of the Schengen Border Code, which clearly states that the right to asylum and protection 
take precedence over the sovereign right of the member state to determine the right to entry . 
(Regulation (EC) 562/2006:art.13(1))
Since the EU takes into account the political and human rights situation of the  countries it ne-
gotiates and concludes readmission agreements with, it is rather unlikely that an EU agree-
ment with Libya could be established under these conditions. With such premises, the Italy-
Libya agreement arguably does not follow the conditions set by the EU either. Moreover, it 
could be argued that the European Council recognition of the need for bilateral agreements, to 
some extent addresses the discrepancy between the conditions the EU poses to third countries 
and the conditions these countries actually fulfil. Therefore, enough political space is left to 
allow member states to sign such agreements with countries with lower standards.
8.4.1 The Libyan incidents
Since the year 2000, Italy and Libya have developed a cooperation agreement on issues of ir-
regular migration: what started as a general agreement to fight terrorism, organised crime and 
irregular migration, extended in 2003 and 2004 to include a readmission and return agree-
ment, border guard training programmes, the construction of detention centres and the fund-
ing of deportation schemes (Andrijasevic, 2009:155). 
It is also as a result of this cooperation, that the rejection of migrants crossing the Mediter-
ranean and bound for the island of Lampedusa took place, both in 2004 and in 2009.
Several NGOs and the UNHCR have criticised these practices on the basis that they are not in 
correspondence with the Refugee Convention and the principle of non-refoulment – this criti-
cism translated in 2005 into a complaint to the European Commission and in a call for sanc-
tions against Italy for: 
“Violation of the right of defence (both with regards to access to an interpreter or a lawyer, or possibility  
of appealing against the expulsion) and of all parties to be heard; and hence the right to asylum as recog-
nised by the Amsterdam Treaty; and [V]iolation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading  
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treatment, provided for in article 4 of the European Charter of fundamental rights and article 3 of the  
European  Convention  for  the  protection  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms”  (Andrijasevic, 
2009:155).
Furthermore the above-mentioned incident violates  article 4 of Protocol 4 of the European 
Convention on Human  Rights and article 19(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
which “[...] prohibit collective expulsion”. In fact:
“The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted 'collective expulsion' to mean 'any measure by  
which  foreigners are forced, as a result of belonging to a group, to leave a country, apart from cases in  
which this measure is adopted following and based on a reasonable and objective assessment of the specif -
ic situation of each of the foreigners who compose the group'.” (HRW, 2006:114).
As illustrated above, the Italian-Libyan agreement on return and readmission and the practices 
to enforce it clearly conflict  with EU provisions laid out in the Amsterdam Treaty,  in the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and also in the European Court of Human Rights' 
interpretation of it. However, the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not have binding status 
until 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, and we cannot regard this as a misfit 
as such. The misfit can nevertheless be pointed out due to the fact that these practices were 
not in concordance with the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and of the Tampere Pro-
gramme. This case, as Italy is not acting as a response to EU policies, can be classified as in-
ertia.
In August 2008 Italy and Libya signed the controversial ‘Treaty of Friendship, Partnership 
and Cooperation’ which further strengthened the cooperation between the two countries and 
prepared the ground for joint naval operations in the Mediterranean (HRW, 2009:24).
These operations are often termed push-back operations as the migrants are prevented from 
even disembarking on Italian soil or lodge an asylum claim – which have been heavily criti-
cised  from both  the  EU,  UNHCR,  ECHR and  various  international  NGOs (HRW,  2009; 
FIDH, 2005), since these practices conflict with various provisions in the Refugee Conven-
tion.
A report issued by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) in 2009 re-
veals several operations that conflict with both the Refugee Convention and hence the EU 
commitments to honour the Fundamental Human Rights:
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“In the CPT’s view, Italy’s policy, in its present form, of intercepting migrants at sea and obliging them to  
return to Libya or other non-European countries, violates the principle of non-refoulement, which forms  
part of Italy’s obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”. (CPT, 2010:25)
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 2008 recognised the possibility and the 
need for bilateral agreements – without explicitly determining the content of such agreements 
– in addition to EU agreements with third countries (Bertozzi, 2008:2). However, as previ-
ously clearly stated, the political and human rights situation in the country in question should 
be considered before entering into any readmission negotiations (COM(2001)672:25).
The push-back operations conducted by Italy and Libya have significantly lowered the num-
ber of arrivals to Lampedusa and Sardinia (HRW 2009:24), de-facto following the indications 
present in Communication (2001)672, that values an effective border control as important to 
prevent and combat illegal immigration. Indeed, “the effectiveness of border controls has un-
doubtedly improved in the last two decades: clandestine entries from the sea have steadily de-
creased  […]”  (Finotelli  &  Sciortino,  2008:5).  However,  the  concordance  with  this 
Communication, is achieved through the discordance with other key guidelines of the EU, as 
presented above.
To sum up, there is clearly a significant misfit between Italy and EU in their approaches to bi-
lateral agreements with third countries. On the one hand the EU stresses the importance and 
need of bilateral agreements and enhanced cooperation with origin and transit countries, while 
on the other hand it stresses the importance of respecting fundamental Human Rights and the 
Refugee Convention. In this regard Italy has chosen not to honour the latter in its agreement 
with Libya.
To try to attribute the Italy-Libya agreement  to  EU as a direct  consequence of top-down 
Europeanisation would be a misinterpretation of facts as this development has clear domestic 
implications. However, as Italy does not follow the guidelines of Communication (2001)672 
nor complies with the provision of the Return Directive, Italy's actions in this area can be re-
garded as inertia. The actual costs of compliance might be very high in terms of domestic 
public sentiment, 
which may explain Italy's reluctance to comply.
Also the EU directive on the return of illegal migrants emphasises the member states obliga-
tions under the Geneva Convention and the right to seek asylum, both of which have to be re-
spected at all times. Italy's repeated practices of returning boats with migrants back to Libya 
without any screening whatsoever, clearly deny migrants their right to seek asylum. Thus, 
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they are in conflict with EU law as well as with the general aspirations of the EU with regard 
to asylum, as, for instance, the Thessaloniki Council of 2003 (Thessaloniki European Council 
Presidency Conclusions, 2003:Conclusion 25). 
8.4.2 Causes behind the Libyan incidents
The Libyan cases of 2004 and 2009 highlight a series of important problematic issues where 
the misfit between EU and Italian policies emerges clearly. Three main areas have been high-
lighted in the previous section as pertaining to this example: the respect of the principle of 
non-refoulement, the externalisation of migration policies and their relation to minimum hu-
man rights standards,  the (im)possibility of lodging an asylum application.
The different aspects of these cases are strictly interrelated and the gap between EU policies 
and the Italian practices are mediated by the same mediating factors. All three are in fact re-
lated to the underlying norms in Italian society about the role of migrants. According to such 
widespread norms, there is a tight connection between illegality and criminality (see section 
5.1.2), and migrants that try to enter the country illegally are labelled as potential criminals. 
With this perspective in mind, it is easy to understand what would motivate Berlusconi's gov-
ernment's choices. The presence in the government of parties such as the Lega Nord and the 
discourse that is built upon the image of clandestine migrants as criminals, is more than a jus-
tification to try to stop (and hence deny entrance) to what often is theatrically described as an 
“invasion” (Corte, 2002:9; Andrijasevic, 2009:156; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:172). It is this 
need to halt the invasion that triggers the other reactions, despite EU directives and guidelines 
would suggest to tackle the issue in drastically different ways. Allowing migrants coming 
from Libya to apply for asylum would result in the impossibility to deny them access. The 
choice of labelling the case as refoulement (FIDH, 2005:29) rather than expulsion to not incur 
in sanctions, carries within it the necessity of considering the migrants as economic migrants 
and not as asylum seekers, a status that would entitle them to the right of not being 'refouled'. 
Moreover, the Italian government interprets the principle of non-refoulement in a restrictive 
way (HRW, 2009:27), in order to protect itself from being sanctioned, and does not question 
whether Libya has sufficient human right standards or what will happen to the returned mi-
grants (FIDH, 2005:28-29).
At the same time, the way migrants are treated and the lack of screening for asylum seekers 
come from this interpretation of the 'invasion' that needs to be stopped, and in order to do so, 
they cannot be recognised as asylum seekers (the treatment of asylum seekers has been dis-
cussed more in depth in section 8.3.1).
72
The pressure coming from society to halt  the invasion is  always one of the main driving 
factors of the externalisation of migration policies.  A survey carried out in  May 2009 by 
'Demos' shows how 67,5% of interviewees considered the rejection of the boats of migrants 
as the right choice (Boca, 2009:32). The Italian government, having picked up the widespread 
feeling of Italian society (see Corte, 2002), is trying to secure the national borders, relocating 
the problem geographically further away. This position, can be also seen as a result of the 
pressure put on the Italian government by Frontex deputy director Gil Arias in December 
2008, which led to a “new action plan to combat illegal immigration at sea, as presented at  
the press conference of 7th May, 2009 by the Minister of Interior, Roberto Maroni” (Boca, 
2009:32).
If the bilateral agreements in themselves do not clash with any EU policy on the matter, the 
choice of repatriation agreements with Libya is at very least dubious, as Libya does not offer 
the  minimum human  right  standards  that  are  required  for  the  same  treaties  at  EU  level 
(COM(2001)672).
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9. Conclusion
As it is impossible to quantify 'how much' reflection there is between the Italian and the EU 
migration and asylum policies, the answer to our research question needs to be articulated 
more in depth. Despite the difficulty in giving a sharp answer, the findings of our analysis do 
point out some of the issues at the core of our research field.
Analysing the level of fit and misfit between the two levels, we have taken into consideration 
both mechanisms of hard and of soft law. During the analysis between EU directives and their 
transposition in Italian law, we have pointed out several cases of absorption and accommoda-
tion, that suggest that the vast majority of hard law mechanisms has been adopted into Italian 
legislation. A number of cases of inertia followed by one of these two degrees of change have 
also been highlighted, due to considerable delays in the transposition of certain directives. 
Nonetheless, these cases of inertia have been followed by a change at the domestic level, 
which included the requirements demanded by the EU. Therefore, by looking exclusively at 
the adoption of EU directives in the Italian legislation, we could state that the Italian policies 
are almost entirely in accordance with the EU policies. However, looking only at this aspect, 
we would be mistaken and our research incomplete.
In fact, as pointed out by some specific cases in the analysis, the level of misfit in certain  
parts of the policy area is still high: if the transposition of EU directives has been effective, 
the same cannot always be said about soft law mechanisms (such as guidelines) and about the 
actual implementation of the directives transposed.
While guidelines are not binding and the non compliance cannot be considered a violation 
(unless other international agreements are violated), the non implementation of EU directives, 
albeit transposed into the national system, is a violation of EU law. Furthermore, it is import-
ant to note how the level of misfit is at its highest regarding issues at the core of the policy 
area,  such as active immigration policies,  treatment of asylum seekers, expulsions and so 
forth. On some of these issues, it  is interesting to highlight how Italy had anticipated EU 
trends (e.g. on expulsions or with the institution of the Decreto flussi), by legislating before 
any clear position from the EU had been expressed on the matter. If this is probably due to its 
geographical position, and hence the direct exposure to migration flows that required ready 
solutions before the EU had started coordinating on the field, it is also likely to be a cause of  
the present misfit. In fact, as presented in the analysis, the absence of EU requirements in cer-
tain fields allowed Italy to set its own standards, and the EU only followed. This is specific-
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ally problematic in fields in which the subsequent EU legislation goes in an opposite direction 
(such as with the regularisations) or sets standards that are not as strict as the national ones 
(such as the expulsion procedures). In these cases, change in order to comply would require 
either a transformation or a loosening of the national standards, that, despite being a small ac-
commodation under a legislative perspective, would in reality conflict with the national norms 
and understanding of migration and its solutions.
Interest findings of this project also regard the role of mediating factors in the shaping of the 
national policies.
As the areas with a big misfit are often areas where strong interests (or norms) are located, it  
is understandable why they tend to attract more actors during the policy making process. As 
highlighted throughout the analysis, national mediating factors seem to involve themselves in 
the process of Europeanisation primarily as veto-points. Policies that have clearly failed in ad-
dressing  EU indications  have  been  strongly  influenced  by actors  or  norms  that  hindered 
change, or shifted change on a different track. In fact, if it is not problematic to comply when 
there are no relevant interests at stake, when many actors have interests in the issue, compli-
ance might be harder to achieve. At the same time, external factors are not exclusively veto-
points, but can also positively mediate and pressure the national level into compliance. Inter-
estingly, in the cases analysed, this happened only when the participation of foreign pressure 
groups was included in the process, together with national actors (i.e. with asylum procedures 
in 2008).
An important conflict surfaced during the making of this project: that between the reality of 
Italian migration and the country's economical needs on one hand, and the norms that mediate 
policy making on the other. In fact, in a country that has a structural need for foreign labour, 
the  negative  perception  of  migrants  and  the  scarce  attention  towards  active  immigration 
policies, seems to cause conflicting policies (such as the Bossi-Fini reform linked with 2002 
regularisation) and off-the-track policies (such as the peculiar use of the  Decreto flussi in 
2006).
Concluding, we can state that Italian policies partially tend to reflect EU policies, but a high 
level of misfit is still present in some of the key issues of the policy area. It seems that Italy 
doesn't oppose to change or to compliance with EU guidelines; however, when the level of 
misfit is too big and a change affects some important national values or interests, several 
factors veto the adoption and implementation of the policy. On the other hand, the positive 
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outcome of foreign mediating factors in certain areas, might mean that stronger pressure from 
the outside could result in the impossibility of maintaining the old interests, and change would 
be triggered.
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10. Discussion
As it was outlined in the methodology chapter (see chapter 3) we have relied on official docu-
ments and academic papers on EU and Italian migration and asylum policies throughout the 
analysis. We find that these documents were sufficient enough to analyse how the develop-
ment of EU policies in this area has influenced the Italian domestic policies, and to identify 
the relevant national actors that have impeded and mediated this process.
In general we are satisfied with the data available which is both relevant and sufficient for an-
swering the research question, because it clearly reflects the development at the EU and Itali-
an level in the field of asylum and migration policy.
The theory of Europeanisation applied in our analysis was selected in order to help us under-
stand the top-down process of adaptational change triggered by the EU, and how these influ-
ence member states. The different categories of domestic outcome have provided us with a 
useful tool to assess the profoundness of the Europeanisation process in the area of asylum 
and migration.
One weakness of our analysis, and of the theory used more in general, is that it’s not always 
easy to attribute the developments at Italian level to EU decisions and policies, and in certain 
cases we have not been able to establish clear links between these two.
This  is  especially difficult  when examining communications,  guidelines  and programmes, 
which are  instruments of soft law. In these cases, we have found it relatively simple to identi-
fy 'negative' cases (e.g. inertia), while the identification of 'positive' ones has been more com-
plex. Although there was not a direct reference to it, if a policy was chosen without absorbing 
EU suggestions, we felt comfortable in stating that the Italian policy makers had consciously 
decided to ignore such a suggestion, since they must have been aware of the EU orientation 
on  the  matter.  On the  opposite,  if  an  Italian  policy went  in  the  same direction  of  a  EU 
guideline without referencing to it, we could not state with certainty that the change was a 
consequence of the EU orientation.
However, when examining directives which are legally binding it is easier to establish the 
‘why’ and identify the mediating factors in order to explain the ‘how’. In this sense it is less 
complicated to examine hard-law instruments. However, this also revealed that Italy mostly 
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tends to adhere to EU decisions in the area of asylum and migration policy when there is a 
hard-law instrument supporting it, which in itself is an interesting conclusion.
Migration and asylum policy have generally been central  issues for state sovereignty and 
European scepticism towards immigration and asylum may explain why the soft instruments 
are not implemented.
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11. Perspectives
As  concluded,  the  misfit  between  EU  and  Italy's  migration  and  asylum  policies  is  still 
significant. 
Several areas are not yet mirroring EU policies, but the frame that brought to the Italy-Libya 
'incident' can well exemplify the dilemmas that the EU is facing.
The Council Regulation 343/2003, states that it is the country where the asylum seeker first 
arrives that bears the responsibility of the entire process of asylum. This has put significantly 
more pressure on southern member states i.e. Italy, Spain, Malta and Greece as a large propor-
tion of asylum seekers and migrants enter  EU through these routes,  while  member states 
without external borders have experienced diminishing pressure in terms of asylum applic-
ants. Furthermore it has resulted in other EU states returning asylum seekers who have trans-
ited through Italy (Sperl, 2007:6). Italy has been transformed, against its will, from a transit 
country from where asylum seekers would venture to other parts of Europe, into a destination 
country. In the agreement with Libya, Italy has been trying to transform Libya into the next 
destination country by pushing the Europeanisation process even further south, therefore re-
lieving some of the pressure from its borders. 
Meanwhile, the EU has begun its own parallel rapprochement with Libya. In June 2005, the 
EU Justice and Home Affairs Council  adopted a Council Conclusion on cooperation with 
Libya on migration issues, which included reinforcing “systematic operational co-operation 
between the respective national services responsible for sea borders,” and developing com-
mon  Mediterranean  Sea  operations  involving  the  temporary  deployment  of  EU  member 
states’ vessels  and  aircraft(EC  Press  Release,  06.03.2005). The  Council  Conclusion  also 
called for exploratory discussions with Libya to “tackle illegal  migration in areas such as  
training,  reinforcement  of  institution  building  and  asylum  issues.'  (EC  Press  Release, 
06.02.2009). Such a process, might be representing the intention of the European Council to 
take direct responsibility for external borders of the Union, therefore relieving Italy (and other 
border countries) of some pressure. In fact, if the current asymmetries are not addressed with-
in the EU cooperation framework by establishing burden-sharing mechanisms both finan-
cially and in terms of quotas, it is unlikely that controversial practices, such as the rejection of 
migrants coming from Libya, will change.
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The burden-sharing is not only a key issue in determining the externalisation policies. In gen-
eral, if the problems caused by migration flows are not addressed with a clear communitarian 
approach,  leaving costs and responsibilities to the more exposed member states, it is unlikely 
to expect that they will give up more of their sovereignty on these issues, while not getting 
anything in return.
Such a collective approach, could reduce the costs of compliance for more exposed member 
states, and could constitute an answer to the issues that have hindered a full adoption and im-
plementation of EU policies until now.
On the other hand, without an increased burden-sharing, it is likely to assume that a full har-
monisation of migration and asylum policies would be harder to achieve. Countries most af-
fected by these issues would not only try and push their agendas at the EU level, trying at 
least to bring home more restrictive regulations, if a sharing of the costs is not accepted. They 
would also not comply with EU regulations in the key issues that they consider affecting their 
situation. This could mean, more than non-transposition of hard-law mechanisms, the lack of 
their implementation, the non respect of, albeit clear, guidelines, and the attempt in finding 
loopholes  or  develop new interpretations  that  would  weaken existing  policies,  as  the  Ita-
ly-Libya case is an emblematic example of.
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